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ABSTRACT
AN ANALYSIS OF EUROPEAN UNION DEMOCRACY-PROMOTION POLICIES
IN BELARUS AND THE IMPACTS THEY HAVE EFFECTED ON DEMOCRATIC
DEEPENING IN THIS AUTHORITARIAN REGIME
Jessie-Leigh O. Thomas
August 5, 2013
This thesis addresses the impact of an external actor’s democracy promotion
policies on domestic democratic development. More specifically, it is a case study of the
European Union as an external actor, using Belarus as the domestic polity of focus. My
research questions are: (1) What have been the policies of the EU intended to encourage
democracy in Belarus? and (2) What have been the impacts of these policies on Belarus’
level of democracy in comparison to the rest of Central and Eastern Europe? To respond
to these questions, a definition and method of measuring democracy is proposed, and
Belarus’ level of democracy as it relates to that of neighboring countries is evaluated.
I theorize that external agents have a significant role in this process, largely
through diffusion. The most important forms of diffusion highlighted in this thesis are
linkage, leverage, neighbor, and that occurring via transnational advocacy networks.
Conditionality, or the notion of an external actor offering a domestic polity a set of
incentives and/or disincentives for modifying its standards, behaviors, practices, etc. is
the method by which the EU most frequently attempts to affect democratization. For this
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reason, EU democracy promotion policies based on conditionality are the focus of this
paper.
I proceed by analyzing three specific, conditionality-based policy instruments the
EU has utilized over the past decade to encourage democratization in Belarus. Each
instrument’s purported objectives, incentives and conditionality requirements are
considered before its impacts are assessed according to the corresponding political
developments in Belarus at that time. This serves as a relevant indicator of whether or not
the policy was successful in meeting its objectives, and may provide further insights into
the types of policies which appear to be successful in effecting democratic progress.
The results found that the policies the EU has implemented thus far have had
varying degrees of success: the Eastern Neighborhood Policy, very strict in its
conditionality requirements, had very little impact; the Eastern Partnership, a more multilateral, collaborative approach with more lenient requirements for participation produced
slightly better results until 2010 when there was a violent political crackdown in Belarus;
lastly, the Dialogue on Modernization, which places a greater emphasis on civil society,
has made greater strides in supporting and legitimizing opposition groups in Belarus –
motivating certain members of the Belarusian political elite to express their desire to
participate, a positive sign. My findings also suggest that initial signs of progress do not
necessarily signal substantive, long-lasting change will occur. Further research into the
EU’s ability to influence democratic change in Belarus is necessary.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The area of contemporary comparative politics has recently witnessed an
increased interest in democratization studies. Sparked by revolutions in Latin America
and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the current global democratization
movement has produced regime transformations at a previously unfathomable rate
(Munck 1994 & Lawson 1993). Consequently, comparative researchers have gone to
great lengths in their attempts to explain this phenomenon. From outlining the necessary
prerequisites for democracy to country case studies of specific democratic transitions to
developing generalizable theories of international democratization, scholars have been
tackling the subject from all angles.
The purpose of this thesis is to address the impact of an external actor’s
democracy promotion policies on domestic democratic development. More specifically, I
conduct a case study of the European Union (EU) as an external actor, using Belarus as
the domestic polity of interest. I address the following research questions: (1) What have
been the policies of the EU intended to encourage democracy in Belarus? and (2) What
have been the impacts of these policies on Belarus’ level of democracy?
King, Keohane, and Verba (1994, 46) assert “the best scientific way to organize
facts is as observable implications of some theory or hypothesis.” The data I have
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collected is therefore rendered more useful when it is understood within the context of a
certain theory. In this thesis, I will employ constructivist theory to frame the presentation
of my observations and respond to my research questions.
Constructivist theory, as it relates to the field of international relations, is
explained by Jeffrey Checkel as resting on two primary assumptions: “(1) the
environment in which agents/states take action is social… and (2) this setting can provide
agents/states with understandings of their interests” (Checkel 1998, 325). Of particular
relevance to the arguments I make later is the concept that states interact with one
another, according to the environment in which they find themselves. Constructivist
theory also provides us an understanding of norms or standards of behavior (Checkel
1998, 326). These interstate exchanges and international norms, according to
constructivist theory, greatly impact on a state’s perceived interests in different situations
and therefore play a role in the actions and choices it makes.
Applying this theory to my research questions, I am primarily concerned with the
interactions occurring between the European Union and Belarus. I will analyze their
actions (that is, the policies implemented by the EU towards Belarus and the Belarusian
response to those policies) based on constructivist theory, assuming that the decisions
made by each actor are inspired by their environment, interactions with one another, and
according to the norms or standards of behavior each actor maintains.
The methodology employed in this thesis is that of a case study, intended to
examine the relationship between a two variables. The dependent variable under
observation is the level of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe since the end of
Communism as it relates to Belarus. Belarus, which has not undergone any significant
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change in its level of democracy is the outlier of this group and this thesis is therefore
concerned with considering the factors influencing (or failing to influence) its level of
democracy. The independent variable which will be considered in this chapter is
European Union democracy promotion policy.
As I elaborate in the third chapter, I have elected to situate my research in the
timeframe from 2002 to the present, primarily because 2002 followed a particularly
difficult year for democracy in Belarus. Based on democracy promotion theory, I
hypothesize that the EU should be relatively effective in bringing about a positive move
toward democratization in Belarus. Using inductive reasoning, I make observations based
on data I have collected from official government documents and websites, academic
journals, online periodicals, and international organizations to respond to my research
question.
The results found that the policies the EU has implemented thus far have had
varying degrees of success: the Eastern Neighborhood Policy, very strict in its
conditionality requirements, had very little impact; the Eastern Partnership, a more multilateral, collaborative approach with more lenient requirements for participation produced
slightly better results until 2010 when there was a violent political crackdown in Belarus;
lastly, the Dialogue on Modernization, which places a greater emphasis on civil society,
has made strides in supporting and legitimizing opposition groups in Belarus –
motivating certain members of the Belarusian political elite to express their desire to
participate, a very positive sign.
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Defining Democracy
Democracy at its most basic level means the rule or power of the people (Lawson
1993, 189). Beyond this definition though, scholarly opinion remains divided concerning
the best operationalization of the term. Some academics opt for a procedural definition,
meaning they focus on democracy as a method of government instead of attaching it to a
set of social, economic or political values or objectives (Weiner 1987, 865). For some,
the holding of elections suffices for a state to be considered a democracy. Others,
however, include considerations of electoral competitiveness and inclusiveness in their
definitions. One example of such a scholar is Joseph Schumpeter (1974, 269), who
argues: “the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political
decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive
struggle for the people’s vote.” Przeworski (1991), Powell (1982), and Schmitter & Karl
(1991) are among those academics who mention free, fair, & competitive elections in
their procedural conceptualizations of democracy.
This type of classification system lends itself to cross-national, empirical testing
as the presence of basic representative institutions or the holding of elections are
scientifically observable. The major critique of procedural conceptualizations though is
that they may allow states holding any form of election to be considered a democracy –
even those where political manipulation and suppression run rampant, and where in
reality a state’s citizens do not exert any meaningful power over the selection of officials.
This is why a second camp in democratization studies argues for a more expanded,
substantive definition of democracy.
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Substantive characterizations of democracy concentrate on the presence of certain
civil and political freedoms and values within a state. For example, values of “liberty,
equality, and fraternity” (Pennock 1979, Lawson 1993) and freedoms of the press, of
expression, of association and rights to assemble, etc. (Dahl 1989, Huntington 1991) are
taken into consideration in evaluating how democratic a state is considered. Substantive
approaches focus less on the institutional arrangements required for democracy and more
on the conditions and participation of the electorate in the voting and decision-making
process (Schmitz 2004, 46). Substantive classifications underscore the reality of political
conditions for a state’s citizens, as opposed to simply determining whether or not its
institutions appear to function democratically. Such definitions are not without fault,
though. Expanded definitions tend to vary with regard to the values and freedoms they
take into account, and normative concepts such as values are, for obvious reasons,
difficult to empirically measure.
In this thesis I will adopt a combined approach in determining what does or does
not make a state democratic, as suggested by Jan Teorell (2010). I will focus on the
following dimensions: whether or not a state holds free, fair and effective elections to the
executive and/or parliamentary bodies of government, as well as long-standing
observations of political and civil liberties (specifically, freedom of association, the right
to peaceably assemble, and freedom of the press). With these characteristics in mind, it is
now possible to proceed to the next issue of how best to measure them.
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Measuring Democracy
There are numerous ways scholars have attempted to measure and classify levels
of democracy across countries. While some gather their own data based on their preferred
sets of indicators and measurement techniques, many rely on long, time-series data
indexes such as Freedom House1 or Polity IV (Bogaards 2010, 476). Freedom House is
an index which uses measures of a state’s political rights and civil liberties to assign it a
score on a scale of one to seven. According to Freedom House:
“Political rights ratings are based on an evaluation of…electoral process, political
pluralism and participation, and functioning of government… Civil liberties
ratings are based on an evaluation of freedom of expression and belief,
associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and
individual rights.” – Freedom In the World 2013, p. 32
Based on this index, a state is considered “free” if it receives a score of 1 to 2.5, “partly
free” with a score of 3 to 5, and “not free” with a score of 5.5 to 7 (Bogaards 2010, 476).
Another widely used database on democratization is Polity IV2. The Polity IV
research scheme measures: “a state’s quality of executive recruitment, constraints on
executive authority, and political competition. It also records changes in the
institutionalized qualities of governing authority,” (Marshall 2011). It rates states’ levels
of democracy and autocracy independently using a scale of 0 to 10, and then provides a
combined rating with a “polity score” ranging from -10 to +10 (Bogaards 2010, 477).
The polities are then assigned labels, ranging from “coherent autocracies” at the lowest
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Freedom House is an independent watchdog organization “dedicated to the expansion of
freedom around the world” (Freedom in the World 2013, 6).
2
Polity IV is the most recently updated version of the original Polity dataset, both of which were
developed under the direction of Ted Gurr & Monty Marhsall (Marshall 2011).
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point, to “incoherent polities” or “anocracies” in the middle, to “coherent democracies” at
the highest level3.
Based on the definition of democracy described above, it follows that attention
should be paid to both the Freedom House and Polity IV datasets. Freedom House scores
pertain specifically to the substantive characteristics of a democracy while Polity IV
tends to concern itself primarily with the procedural elements. Moreover, Teorell (2010)
found systematic measurement errors in each dataset, with Freedom House tending to
underestimate a country’s level of democracy and Polity IV frequently overestimating it
(Teorell 2010, 33). Thus, taking both into consideration provides us with a way to
effectively analyze a country by using a broad range of indicators and attempting to
minimize the measurement errors observed in the statistics provided by both scales.

Belarus: A Non-Democracy
Using these scales, I can evaluate the recent level of democracy in Belarus in an
attempt to understand why the EU has deemed it necessary to instigate democracy
promotion efforts in this country. The Polity IV scale assigned Belarus a democracy
score of “0” and an autocracy score of “7,” meaning its combined polity score was “ -7”
for 2011 (Marshall & Cole 2011). Its numbers were identical for 2009 and 2010
(Marhsall & Jaggers 2010). This score has earned it the classification of an
institutionalized autocratic regime. While it rated very low (having no) political
legitimacy, Belarus’ fragility index score indicates that it is a relative stable, durable
regime (Marshall 2011). Polity IV data also classified Belarus’ executive recruitment as
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Specifically, “coherent autocracies” have a score from -10 to -7; “incoherent polities” or
“anocracies” -6 to +6; and “coherent democracies” a score from +7 to +10 (Bogaards 2010, 477).
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being “designated” (largely due to the President’s overarching powers, ability to amend
the constitution almost at whim and the weakness of democratic institutions); and the
country’s political participation level as “restricted competition” (citing instances of
government intimidation, voting fraud, and repression of the media and civil society)
(Marhsall 2011).
Similarly, Freedom House data dating back to 1998 finds that at no point from
that time to the present has Belarus been considered free, or even partly free. It has
consistently scored a 6 or 6.5 on this scale, falling well within the classification of “not
free” (which requires a score of 5.5 to 7). According to Freedom House, a country is
classified as “not free” when: “basic political rights are absent, and basic civil liberties
are widely and systematically denied” (Freedom House 2013). In the most recent
analysis of Belarus, this watchdog organization pointed clearly to instances of voting
fraud and irregularities in the September 2012 parliamentary elections as a sign that
Belarus was far from free. It further elaborated instances of harassment and intimidation
of online and independent media by government officials and agencies as well as
describing Belarusian limitations on freedoms of association and the right to peaceably
assemble (ibid).
Democracy Indicators
2002

2005

2009

2010

2011

2012

Freedom
House

6

6.5

6.5

6.5

6.5

6.5

Polity IV

-7

-7

-7

-7

-7

-7

Sources: Freedom in the World (2013) and Marshall (2011).
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These indicators show that Belarus has and has had a history of weak democratic
institutions, is wrought with corruption and fraud; and is a country in which civil and
political liberties are vehemently repressed by an authoritarian government. As
evidenced by the Polity IV data, Alyaksandr Lukashenka has managed to form a
relatively durable authoritarian regime in his nearly twenty years as president of Belarus
(Marhsall & Cole 2011). How can an external actor such as the EU hope to elicit a
democratic transition in what the premier democratization studies classify a stable,
institutionalized autocracy? Part of the answer to this question lies in the theoretical
literature of international democratic diffusion.

Belarus: The Outlier
The case of Belarus has been chosen for its role as an outlier from many proposed
theories about the experience of Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs)
undertaking democratic transitions. It has not responded to EU conditionality as have
most of the post-Soviet states (which may be accounted for by the fact that it has retained
the closest relationship with Russia out of any of the former Soviet republics) (Nice 2012,
5). In fact, Thomas Ambrosio (2006) refers to Belarus as an example of a pariah regime
in Europe, which would “normally satisfy the formal criterion of procedural democracy
but [is] deficient in those areas of substantive democracy relevant to international
opinion, especially in the part of the world in which [it is] located” (Pridham 2001,
quoted in Ambrosio 2006, 411). The survival of such regimes is interesting for the study
of democratization because they raise questions about the generalizability of theories
pertaining to external factors of democratic transitions.
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Structure of this Thesis
Having now defined the term democracy, presented the ways in which it is
measured, and explained Belarus’ unique position as an authoritarian outlier among its
European neighbors, I will move on to a more in-depth discussion of democracy
promotion theory. In particular, I contend that external agents have a significant role in
this process, largely through diffusion. The most important forms of diffusion highlighted
in this thesis are linkage, leverage, neighbor diffusion, and that which occurs via
transnational advocacy networks. Conditionality, or the notion of an external actor
offering a domestic polity a set of incentives and/or disincentives for modifying its
standards, behaviors, practices, etc. is the method by which the EU most frequently
attempts to use diffusion to affect democratization. For this reason, the focus of
discussion is primarily on EU democracy promotion policies based on conditionality.
I proceed by analyzing three specific, conditionality-based policy instruments the
EU has utilized over the past decade to encourage democratization in Belarus. Each
instrument’s purported objectives, incentives and conditionality requirements are
considered before its impacts are assessed according to the corresponding political
developments in Belarus at that time. This serves as a relevant indicator of whether or not
the policy was successful in meeting its objectives, and may provide further insights into
the types of policies which appear to be successful in effecting democratic progress.
The results found that the policies the EU has implemented thus far have had
varying degrees of success: the Eastern Neighborhood Policy, very strict in its
conditionality requirements, had very little impact; the Eastern Partnership, a more multilateral, collaborative approach with more lenient requirements for participation produced
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slightly better results until 2010 when there was a violent political crackdown in Belarus;
lastly, the Dialogue on Modernization, which places a greater emphasis on civil society,
has made strides in supporting and legitimizing opposition groups in Belarus –
motivating certain members of the Belarusian political elite to express their desire to
participate, an indicator of progress.
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CHAPTER 2
THEORIES OF DEMOCRACY PROMOTION

Democracy promotion theory, much like constructivist theory, revolves around
the interaction of different agents. In the case of democracy promotion, one can infer the
presence of an external agent acting or influencing a domestic polity. The domestic
polity is possessed of certain internal characteristics as well which determine how it
accepts and relates to the actions taken by the external agent. The first step in analyzing
the EU’s capacity to influence democratization in Belarus will therefore be to consider
the role of internal and external factors in democratic transitions.
Once the significant impact external actors purportedly have on domestic agents
has been established, I will discuss democracy promotion as a process of diffusion.
Diffusion, as shall be explained, occurs most notably on the regional level and on the
level of international organizations. The diffusion of democratic norms can occur in a
variety of ways; the method most widely used by the EU is that of conditionality (by
which certain incentives, i.e. economic assistance, are exchanged for democratic
reforms). While the Union offers authoritarian states such as Belarus many incentives to
democratize, its conditionality requirements are sometimes met with hostility;
antidemocratic rulers may look to other international actors with fewer requisites to have
their needs met. How these options appeal to Belarus will be addressed in the subsequent
parts of this thesis.
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External and Internal Factors
An ample amount of international relations literature attempts to justify
democracy promotion strategies employed by democratic nations to foster democracy in
other states. Two fairly distinct camps have emerged: those scholars arguing that internal
or domestic circumstances decide a country’s likeliness to democratize (the majority),
and those who make the case that external actors play a more influential role4. The first
camp, which enjoys the broadest amount of consensus among democracy promotion
scholars (McFaul 2007, 47), contends that domestic ruling factions, economic
development, and the strength of institutions are largely accountable for democratic
transitions (Yilmaz 2009, 92). Those following this logic may argue, for example, that
circumstances such as a state’s perception of its national history influences that state’s
desire and willingness to democratize. In the case of Belarus, its national history has been
closely tied to that of both Russia5 and Europe; however Belarusian citizens’ fierce sense
of independence and its position as a nation between to super-powers is one of its most
intriguing features. The strong belief of the Belarusian public that Belarus is a unique
power devoid of outside influence (Lukianov 2006) has made it possible for President
Lukashenka to protect his power and use this sense of nationalism and sovereignty as a
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  It is worth noting here that even scholars who put forth arguments that external factors play an
influential role in democratic transitions acknowledge that the international influence is mediated
through (and therefore affected by) domestic actors and conditions.	
  
5
Lukashenka has, since coming to office, promoted the retelling of Belarus’ Soviet past over its
European past, and has made Russian a national language in Belarus, largely with the intention of
fostering pro-Russian sentiments in civil society which make him popular for maintaining close
partnerships with Russia (Bekus 2008).
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barrier against absorption into another supranational body (which may reduce his
influence) (Zakaria 2003).
In addition, scholars focusing on internal factors frequently make the case that
there is a higher percentage of democracies observed among wealthy nations as opposed
to poor ones6, suggesting that higher national incomes are more likely to foster
democracies in undemocratic states or to preserve democratic regimes in states where
they already exist than lower ones (Przeworski et al. 2000). This does not appear to be the
case for Belarus, which has a relatively high national income compared to other countries
around the world. Another domestic socio-economic factor is argued to be income
distribution: countries with low levels of income inequality are believed to harbor better
conditions for democracy (Boix & Stokes 2008). Yet again, this does not explain
Belarus’ reluctance to democratize, as the country has a fairly equal income distribution
with a World Bank (GINI) score of 27.27 in 2008. Finally, Colaresi and Thompson (2003,
388) have suggested that economic growth and development correlate positively to
democratization because they increase levels of education, which in turn increases
political participation8. Once again, Belarus’ high literacy rate of 99.8% (Mundi Index
2009) does not explain its lack of democratization according to this theory. If these
internal factors do not provide a rationale for the absence of democracy in Belarus,
perhaps we should consider instead the role of external agents in democratic
development.
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In 2000, a wealthy nation was considered one with a Gross National Income per capita of $4000
USD or more (Przeworski et al. 2000). Belarus’ 2011 GINI was $5,830 (World Bank GINI per
capita, Atlas Method 2012).
7
For comparison, the US has a score of 45, indicating that it possesses a greater income disparity
between rich and poor than that of Belarus (World Bank 2008).
8
Lipset, Kyoung-Ryong, & Torres (1993) argued a similar case for growth and the educated
public demanding more political participation.
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During a time when the state had a considerable amount of control over what took
place inside their borders, the analysis of internal factors was likely more relevant than in
the globalized situation most states (including Belarus) face today. Their borders have
become more porous, with the Internet, satellites, and international NGOs making it
difficult to control the flow of information into and out of their borders (Yilmaz 2009,
100). Violations of human rights or political violence taking place within a country have
been made more visible to the rest of the world thanks to the information networks of
human rights organizations and the ability of the average citizen to instantly transmit
images and information across borders via cell phones and other telecommunications
devices.
Nations have also become increasingly interdependent as a result of growing
international trade flows, such as foreign direct investment, and are consequently more
vulnerable to the demands of those international actors controlling capital movements
and investment decisions (Yilmaz 2009, 101). They are forced to respond to growing
formal and informal limits to their domestic policy choices resulting from denser
institutional regulation and an ever-expanding number of agreements binding them to one
another. This is why states are often viewed, not as single units operating according to
predefined self-interest, but as members of an international community (Meyer et al.
1997, 152). It is accurate, therefore, to observe that “democratization… do[es] not occur
in an international vacuum” (Colaresi & Thompson 2003, 382). A positive domestic
environment undoubtedly plays a role in any successful democratic transition (Ambrosio
2006, 408); however this increased interdependency among nations leads one to seriously
consider external actors as transformative agents of a state’s progress toward democracy.
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External actors generally seek to promote democratization in a country when they
perceive such actions will, in some way, benefit their interests, be they material or moral
ones. Their perceptions of what constitutes the notion of “benefit” also varies. In the
case of the European Union, democracy promotion rests primarily on two ideas. First, the
EU ascribes to the “democratic peace” theory, under which democratic countries are
believed to resolve their problems by peaceful means instead of resorting to war and
violence (Elman 1997). Second, the EU recognizes that as a consequence of the growing
economic interdependence among nations, countries have more to gain from the peaceful
settlement of disputes than from violent conflict (Vysotskaya 2008, 2). The EU therefore
elects to engage in democracy promotion in its surrounding areas because it believes that
having democratic neighbors will ensure peace in its neighborhood; moreover, the Union
has faith it can reasonably accomplish this objective based on the economic incentives it
is able to offer partner countries.
When external agents promote democracy, they act as gravitational pulls on target
states, attracting them to or, sometimes, pushing them out of their orbit depending on the
incentives and restrictions they offer or require (Ambrosio 2006). Political elites and
domestic populations are not merely passive objects of external influence; they are active
agents of change who respond to and condition external actions (Pollard 1999). The
influence of external agents on the process of democratic consolidation can therefore be
understood as one which is mediated through domestic social, economic and political
institutions (Steves 2001, 340). This is why I shall not only consider the actions
undertaken by the EU intended to encourage democratization in Belarus, but will also
take into account the reactions of the Belarusian administration. This interplay of
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external agents and domestic mediators is what ultimately determines whether democracy
succeeds or fails in a state (Schmitz 2004, 418).
Because of such domestic mediation, external actors are somewhat limited in the
scope of domestic actors and circumstances they are able to influence. The European
Union cannot control, for example, certain conditions initiated by countervailing
international agents and their respective powers, incentives, etc. (Pridham 2007, 349).
There are also a host of domestic factors over which the EU cannot have direct influence:
for instance, the Union has little say in the ways a domestic government limits, filters, or
spins information produced by the EU before it is dispersed to the general public. The
EU may be able to provide incentives for freedom of the press, but it cannot impose this
on the domestic polity. External agents like the EU are also limited by the capacity of the
target state to implement reform measures. Other constraints, such as an institutionalized
autocrat’s willingness to undertake reforms, are also outside the EU’s realm of direct
control (Pridham 2007, 350). Despite these limitations though, the European Union has
made democracy promotion in its region a paramount foreign policy objective (McFaul
2007). To understand how this process takes place, it is first useful to conceive of
democracy promotion as one type of international diffusion.

Diffusion
A general definition of diffusion explains it as the "spread of a practice within a
social system, where the spread denotes flow or movement from a source to an adopter
typically via communication, role modeling, and/or coercion” (Rogers 1995 in Wejnert
2005, 55). In terms of international relations, the term diffusion “refers to the various
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interactions and inter-linkages between two structures, one being the international context
and the other one a single country that is situated in that context” (Yilmaz 2009, 94).
One can also think of diffusion as “how linkages to external actors and events influence
the relative power and the likely strategies and choices of relevant groups in struggles
over political institutions and outcomes” (Gleditsch & Ward 2006, 918). Democracy
promotion is therefore a type of diffusion in that external actors seek to spread the
practice of democracy to targeted domestic polities via the inter-linkages existing (or
fostered) between the two.
More specifically, political scientists have conceptualized of different manners in
which democratic diffusion occurs. Laurence Whitehead (1991), for example, has
theorized that the spread of democracy occurs via convergence. Convergence occurs
when an authoritarian country joins a pre-existing community of democratic states
without losing its national sovereignty (for example, when Spain, Portugal and Greece
democratized and then integrated into the European Community) (Whitehead 1991 as
explained in Yilmaz 2009, 94). Another framework for understanding democratic
diffusion is Geoffrey Pridham’s concept of system penetration (Pridham 1991). This
theory emphasizes the long-term external agents that infiltrate a domestic system,
affecting the contextual conditions under which internal political processes occur.
According to Pridham’s system penetration framework, even where there is no immediate
external factor at the actual moment of a regime change or democratic reform, the longterm impact of external actors should still be taken into consideration when analyzing
those events (Pridham 1991 cited in Yilmaz 2009, 94). As shall be elaborated in the
following chapter, the European Union relies heavily on convergence and system
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penetration to spread its democratic ideals to neighboring states. The extent to which the
EU can be successful in this endeavor is determined by the level of linkage and leverage
it enjoys with a target state.

Linkage
Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way (2005) assert that linkage and leverage are
important conditions affecting an external agent’s ability to influence democratic
development in a country. Linkage is defined as the interrelationships and
interdependencies existing between external and internal developments; in layman’s
terms, linkage refers to the density of ties between external and internal actors. These
ties may be:

(1) economic, including credit, investment and assistance
(2) geopolitical, tying a state to Western governments and organizations
(3) social, including tourism, migration, and Western-educated elites
(4) communicative, meaning cross-border telecommunications, the
Internet, and Western media penetration
(5) civil society focused, covering ties to NGOs, churches, political
parties, etc.
(Levitsky & Way 2005, 22-23)

Linkage, in any form or a combination of these forms, raises the cost of authoritarianism
by:

1) heightening the salience in the West of authoritarian abuse
2) increasing the probability of an international response
3) creating domestic constituencies with a stake in adhering to democratic norms
4) strengthening democratic forces in relation to autocrats
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(Levitsky & Way 2005, 23)
Authoritarian states with low linkage can generally repress domestic opposition groups
without paying a heavy international cost, while those with extensive linkage to the West
receive close scrutiny of their domestic politics and are thus subject to intense
international pressures to reform.
In the case of Belarus and the European Union, relatively low levels of linkage
exist, as Belarusian society remains relatively isolated from Europe. Despite being a
direct neighbor of three EU Member States, most Belarusians have never visited the EU.
In the early to mid-2000s, it was estimated that as few as one in twenty Belarusians
visited the EU (Potocki 2011, 51). According to a 2009 poll, 67% of Belarusians have
never been in neighboring Lithuania or Poland, let alone more distant European countries
(Lahviniec & Papko 2010, 258). The cause of this phenomenon, argue Belarusian
scholars, lies in high visa prices and complicated visa procedures. One may also point to
weak business contacts between the two entities, and the relative insignificance of
academic exchanges (Lahviniec & Papko 2010, 259).
Beyond direct interaction with Europeans, there is also the matter of information
flows between the EU and Belarus. Belarusians receive very little by way information
about the EU as such and life in its Member States, even in those that have recently
joined. Belarusian Internet usage has been frequently reported as quite low compared to
neighboring countries, and what use does occur is strictly filtered by the government.
Consequently, Western penetration and information flows from the West have been, and
continue to be severely limited. Following the March 2006 presidential elections, though,
the EU has made efforts to expand its connection to Belarusian society (for example,
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increasing cross-border information flows via the Warsaw-based European Radio for
Belarus and support for Belarus’ first Belarusian-focused, independent satellite-TV
channel) (Potocki 2011, 54). The audience for most media financed by the European
Commission or by individual EU countries and the US—the Belarusian Service of Polish
Radio, Radio Liberty, Radio Racyja, European Radio for Belarus, Belsat TV—does not
exceed 5% of the adult population; and these media are often underfunded. The only
exception to this rule is the Russian Service of Euronews, watched by 16% of Belarusians
(Lahviniec & Papko 2010, 258).
The relative isolation of Belarus from the EU creates a situation in which
Lukashenka’s authoritarian regime maintains a significant amount of power, in part
because it effectively prevents European influence (ideas and values) from permeating
Belarusian society. At the same time, European society is possessed of little knowledge
of the situation in Belarus (i.e. the political atrocities being committed), meaning
Lukashenka’s regime generally has the ability to act however it likes and infringe upon
the human rights of its people without attracting much attention in the European media or
public. Only the most widespread, heinous acts (such as the 2010 crackdown) or the
highest level of political abuses (the 2012 parliamentary elections) appear to be addressed
by the Union on a broad scale (for example, communications by the Council,
Commission decisions, etc.). Low levels of linkage between the EU and Belarus are thus
one explanation behind Belarus’ reluctance to democratize; another reason may involve
the amount of leverage Europe exerts (or does not exert) over Belarus.

Leverage
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Leverage refers to the authoritarian environment’s vulnerability to external
democratizing pressure (Levitsky & Way 2005, 21). Such pressure may take the form of
political conditionality, punitive sanctions, diplomatic pressure, and military intervention.
States thus feel the most vulnerable when their position of leverage is weak in
comparison to other states (Levitsky & Way 2005, 21). A study by Michael Colaresi and
William Thompson (2003) demonstrated that the greater the trade interdependence of a
country, the more likely it is that the country will be exposed to pressures from the
outside world. For businesses that depend on transnational economic activity, normviolating government behavior risks triggering sudden shifts in investments or trade
flows. Consequently, domestic sensitivity to a regime’s image abroad is heightened, and
international norms become domestic demands (Levitsky & Way 2005, 24).
Depending on the levels of linkage and leverage between two actors, diffusion
may or may not occur. If enough points of connection are present between two states,
and an external actor has an advantageous position over a potential democratizer, there is
a high probability that an external agent can exact a meaningful influence over the
decisions of a domestic regime. Such diffusion has been theorized as occurring primarily
on a regional level (“neighbor diffusion”) and also at a transnational level (i.e.
supranational organizations and networks).

Neighbor Diffusion
Because democratic diffusion analysis at the international level is an “aggregate
mask[ing] large regional differences and variation,” international processes influencing
democratization are not likely to be found at a global level (Gleditsch & Ward 2011,
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916). Instead, many international relations scholars argue that neighboring states have a
greater impact on democratization; some use as evidence the fact that countries tend to
democratize in clusters: for example, Southern Europe in the 1970s, Latin America in the
1980s, and the post-Soviet states in the 1990s (Wejnert 2005, 54). This clustering within
regions suggests that domestic political climates are influenced by external
circumstances, particularly those occurring within a state’s immediate region (Wejnert
2005, 54).
One of the rationales behind the significant impact of neighbor/ regional diffusion
on democratization prospects is one state’s proximity to another is closely associated with
the frequency and closeness of interactions and communications between those states
(Wejnert 2005, 56)9. As interstate interactions and communications increase, so does the
capacity of a potential democratizer to observe and learn from a neighboring democratic
country. Equally important is the impact of regionalism, which refers to the “relationship
between a state’s internal political process and the values and norms that dominate its
region” (Ambrosio 2006, 409). Authoritarian regimes situated in regions dominated by
democratic governments are therefore likely to feel greater pressure to undergo
democratic reforms due to fears of international isolation or being perceived by other
states as illegitimate (Ambrosio 2006, 409-410).
A study by Kristian Gleditsch & Michael Ward (2006) found that a higher
proportion of democratic neighbors significantly decreased the likelihood that an
autocracy would endure, and increased the likelihood that democracies would be
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Barbara Wejnert’s study illustrated that in most regions (Central and Eastern Europe were
included in the majority), exposure to media positively affected democratic growth. Only in the
most reluctant of democratizers (in particular, the Middle East) did media exposure elicit a
negative reaction (Wejnert 2005, 72).
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sustained (Gleditsch & Ward 2006, 925)10. In particular, a transition in a neighboring
democracy was shown to significantly decrease the likelihood that an autocracy would
endure. Furthermore, they found that autocracies were significantly less likely to last: in
a region with a high level of democratic states, when a neighboring state underwent a
democratic transition, and/or when less conflict was present in that region (Gleditsch &
Ward 2006, 925 and Teorell 2010).
Democratic diffusion within a state’s neighborhood is also important because
states make decisions of whether or not to democratize based on the perceived costs and
benefits of reforms, a calculation which can be greatly enhanced by observing
experiences of neighboring states. Initially reluctant leaders in autocracies may be more
willing to initiate difficult reforms if democratic transitions made by other states suggest
that the costs and consequences of reforms may not be as bad as they had feared. Thus,
fears of transitioning to democracy should weaken as more reference countries become
successful democracies (Gleditsch & Ward 2006, 920). Belarus’ strong reaction against
the Color Revolutions of nearby Ukraine and Georgia in the mid-2000s suggests that the
converse of this argument is also valid. An authoritarian state may view the experiences
of other similar states as undesirable and elect to preempt similar events from occurring
in their state (for example, by blocking transnational networking of domestic NGOs in
pre-electoral periods or by preventing opposition access to media outlets) (Silitski 2010,
62). It is the objective of a democracy promoting state to convince an authoritarian polity
that the benefits of implementing democratic reforms will exceed the potential costs.

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
10

Jan Teorell’s 2010 study analyzing variables almost identical to those of Gleditsch and Ward
produced similar results.
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Engagement in the successful democratic transitions of surrounding states may be a way
of establishing one’s reputation as a fair and/or generous partner in such pursuits.

Transnational Advocacy Networks
Similar to the logic behind diffusion processes occurring within a state’s
immediate geographic region, diffusion may also take place between states that are
proximate in their international and regional political activities. Several international
relations scholars have, through a variety of research methods, found that regional,
international, and/or supranational, democratic organizations possess a strong capacity
for furthering democratization (Ambrosio 2006, Teorell 2010, Wejnert 2005, Gleditsch &
Ward 2011, and Pevehouse 2005). Specifically which type of supranational body exerts
the most influence on democracy promotion remains contested; it is therefore useful to
employ Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink’s more inclusive definition of transnational
activity networks in conceptualizing these entities. Keck and Sikkink (1999, 91) conceive
of transnational activity networks as “political spaces, in which differently situated actors
negotiate – formally or informally – the social, cultural and political meanings of their
joint enterprises.” The notion of advocacy, included in their terminology, is also
important in that it suggests the entity promotes and/ or defends a particular (generally, a
normative) cause, practice, or set of values (Keck & Sikkink 1999, 92).
Transnational advocacy groups seek to influence policy outcomes as well as “the
terms and nature of the debate” (Keck and Sikkink 1999, 91). These goals may be
accomplished in a number of ways. For example, democracy promoters may challenge an
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autocratic regime’s status quo by using universally accepted and institutionalized sets of
democratic principles to undermine that regime’s international legitimacy (Schmitz 2004
and Keck & Sikkink 1999). The greater the difference between how a state governs itself
(or the norms it practices) domestically and how the transnational network of which it is a
member elects to govern itself, the more likely it is that the democratic body will expose
the contradictions and use its powers to encourage the state to move toward democracy
(Schmitz 2004, 409).
Jon Pevehouse (2005) has suggested three distinct causal mechanisms through
which membership in a transnational advocacy network may further the level of
democratization in a country:
(1) pressure- through open condemnation and threats of sanctions or other
punishments, such as membership refusal or suspension. For example, a regional
organization may threaten the economy of an authoritarian regime and potentially
help weaken an authoritarian regime’s hold on power;
(2) the acquiescence effect- suggesting that involvement in a regional body may
enhance the support of the economic and political elite in adhering to democratic
norms, thereby putting the authoritarian leader in a position of having to
acquiesce to the desires of these influential groups;
(3) legitimation- or the notion of throwing regional support behind an opposition
group. It may also mean delegitimizing the incumbent leadership on a regional or
international level, thereby calling into question that party’s legitimacy on the
domestic level.
(Pevehouse 2005, 17-27)
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Empirical testing in recent years has given added weight to the theory of
democratic diffusion through supranational organizations or networks. Pevehouse (2005)
and Teorell (2010) found, based on statistical evidence, that the level of democracy of a
regional organization (that is, how democratic are its members) is the most influential
factor of how effective these bodies are at affecting democratization. An authoritarian
state’s membership in such bodies significantly increased a country’s democracy score
compared to membership in similar organizations where all members were authoritarian
states. This would lead one to believe then that entities like the EU and the transnational
advocacy networks of which it is a part it both precipitate a move toward democracy and
enhance the chances for successful democratic consolidation (Teorell 2010). One of the
most frequently used (and arguably, most effective) means of democracy promotion used
today by the European Union is conditionality (Gledistch & Ward 2011).

Conditionality
Conditionality is “an active policy that influences the cost-benefit analysis of an
authoritarian regime, with the purpose of promoting democracy” (Ambrosio 2006, 410).
Specifically, it involves the EU “imposing or threatening to impose sanctions or
providing or promising to provide rewards in order promote or protect democracy”
(Schmitter & Brouwer 1999 in Yilmaz 2009, 98). European political conditionality has,
since the development of the Copenhagen criteria11, expanded in scope, so that it now
covers:
The stability of democratic institutions, the rule of law and human and
minority rights… the strengthening of state capacity, the independence of
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The Copenhagen criteria were established in 1993 and outline the conditions which much be
met to be considered for membership in the European Union (Pridham 2007 351).
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judiciaries, the pursuit of anti-corruption measures and the elaboration of a
series of particular human and minority rights… [as well as] economic, social
and cultural rights…
(Dimitrova and Pridham 2004, 97)
The objectives of having these conditions met comprise a bulk of the EU’s negotiating
points when it enters into agreements and/or partnerships with undemocratic associates.
The Union offers authoritarian regimes incentives such as closer ties, economic
assistance, etc. in exchange for steps taken toward democracy and/or human rights.
Alternatively, those regimes electing to continue suppressive measures against
their citizens may be punished via trade sanctions and international isolation (Ambrosio
2006, 410). In such instances, the highest international authorities, such as the Council of
Europe, OSCE, the EU and NATO can push a state to democratize by threatening to
withhold recognition of its sovereignty (which is called into question if not recognized by
other states) and/or its legitimacy (Agh 1999, 267). For example, public condemnation of
a CEE regime by institutions such as the Council of Europe, the OSCE, or EU in general
would threaten the recognition of that state’s external legitimacy, potentially undermining
that regime’s internal legitimacy and popular support. (Steves 2001, 347).
Several scholars studying the potential effects of European conditionality have
found that conditionality without a real prospect for the target country to become an EU
Member State is largely ineffective (Schmitter & Brouwer 1999, Dimitrova & Pridham
2004, and Ethier 2003). This has been the case for the CEECs (where democratization
efforts were largely successful as the probability of membership was high) as well as the
Mediterranean and North African countries, where democracy promotion efforts, such as
the Barcelona Process or the Union for the Mediterranean, have yielded no tangible
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results since these countries have little real hope of accession to the Union (Dimitrova &
Pridham 2004).
In fact, Hakan Yilmaz (2009) proposes a set of four meta-conditions which must
arguably be met for EU conditionality to be effective:
- The correct balance of requirements and incentives: the target country must
receive enough benefits to make the cost of adjusting to EU requirements
worthwhile
- Consistent application: the EU cannot change conditionality requirements
halfway through the process
- Uniform conditions: ALL candidate countries must meet the same requirements
-Prospect of membership: once conditions are met, EU Membership must be
attainable
(Yilmaz 2009, 99)
Conditionality is important in the democracy promotion process in that it directly
links the external pressures and agents to a state’s (or, more specifically, an authoritarian
ruler’s) decision-making regarding reforms. The state is forced to include the price it will
have to pay to external agents in its cost-benefit analysis of suppression versus
liberalization (Yilmaz 2009). As the number of democracies in the world increases, the
costs are likely increase over time (Gleditsch & Ward 2006, 921). Thus, as external
penalties for not democratizing increase, the likelihood for authoritarian rulers to allow
democratic reforms also increases (Ambrosio 2006, 410).
The European Union has enjoyed a relatively high amount of success employing
its political conditionality method, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, with four
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former Soviet states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland) successfully completing
requirements for accession and joining the EU in 2004 (Sadurski 2004). It appears
though that the EU’s use of conditionality with regard to Belarus has been relatively
unsuccessful, given the country’s consistently poor democracy ratings over the past
decade. One possible explanation for this lack of success is the presence of
countervailing forces acting on Belarus, Russia in particular.

Countervailing Forces: the Russian Bear
If we conceive of external agents as gravitational pulls on Belarus, it possible to
imagine the EU as one planet seeking to pull Belarus into its sphere of influence, and
Russia on the opposite side pulling Belarus away from Europe. Competing external
interests in the country influence Belarus’ receptiveness (or lack thereof) to European
conditionality measures. Thus, to understand the shifting positions of Belarus with
regard to the European Union, it is useful to consider Belarus’ relationship with Russia.
Belarus’ historically close ties to Russia have helped insulate the autocratic government
from Western (European) democratizing pressures. The Lukashenka regime’s flagrant
disregard for human rights and democratic principles led to Belarus’ estrangement from
the Western democratic community; however the country did not shoulder much burden
as a consequence. Russian energy subsidies and economic assistance (estimated at 20
percent of the country’s GDP) cushioned the impact of isolation for years (Levitsky &
Way 2005, 32).
When considering the impact of Russia versus the EU on Belarus, it is also useful
to address the amount of foreign direct investment both actors contribute to the
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Belarusian economy as well as how much they provide Belarus in terms of aid and
assistance packages. This is largely because Belarus’ current economic policy requires
constant financial support from the outside (Belarus In Focus 2013). While the data
regarding Russian investments in Belarus is not likely to be completely accurate, certain
estimations provide a vague idea of the situation.
For example, the Russian portion of gross FDI inflow to Belarus was estimated at
60.8 per cent of the total in 2011 (KMPG 2011). Also in 2011 Russia agreed to provide
Belarus with an estimated US $3 billion loan. In addition, Russia valued its assistance to
Belarus at US $6 billion in 2012 (over 35% of the national budget). Most of this
assistance comes in the form of preferential pricing on oil, gas, and low-interest loans;
however in June of 2012 Russia also signed a contract with Belarus for the construction
of a nuclear power plant, opening up a line of credit estimated at US $10 billion
(Wierzbowska-Miazga 2013, 23).
Comparatively, the EU provides a competitive amount of trade with Belarus in
comparison to Russia (the EU estimated at 40.9% in 2012 with Russia at 46.7%) (Firsava
2013). However, it offers Belarus significantly less foreign investment and aid to
Belarus. For the period 2007 to 2011, a total of € 46.07 million was allocated to Belarus
via the ENPI (Europa.eu 2011). For the period 2011 to 2013, the estimated amount of
assistance to Belarusian civil society via the ENPI was around € 15.6 million (Europa.eu
2011). The total budget for the ENPI for 2012 to 2013 was estimated around EUR 38
million, a notable boost from the total budget from 2007 to 2011 (Europea.eu 2012).
Thus Belarus’ economic relationship with Russia has been historically very close,
and things do not appear to be changing anytime soon. Belarus agreed to form a Customs
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Union with Russia and Kazakhstan in 2007, ratifying the document in 2010, weeks
before its presidential elections (Nice 2012, 5). More recently, in May 2013, the three
partners announced plans for the Eurasian Economic Union, envisaged to facilitate trade
among the partners, to be launched in January 2015 (Belarus in Focus 2013). Moreover,
Russia offers Belarus such economic incentives without requiring any changes to
Lukashenka’s authoritarian regime. These economic benefits in addition to the
sociocultural and historical factors and the fact that Russia does not push a democratic
agenda while providing such attractive incentives, have kept Belarus well within the
Russian realm of influence.
Yet it is important to understand the other side of this dynamic as well. Belarus is
a country that values strongly its independence; this may be attributed in part to
Lukashenka’s desire to retain sole control over the country. Thus, the Belarusian
authorities are cautious of allowing Russia too much influence in their domestic
economic situation. Belarus has demonstrated great reluctance to Russian desires of
acquiring Belarusian enterprises and assets, thereby indicating its reluctance to integrate
too fully with Russia (Nice 2012, 7). Opinion polls indicate that a significant portion of
the population is against such integration (IISEPS).
Belarusian Attitudes toward Russia and the EU
For or Against Integration
with Russia
2002
2006
2010
2013
For
53.8%
44.9%
32.1%
51.4%
Against
26.3%
28.9%
44.5%
28.1%
Don’t know/ No opinion
19.9%
26.2%
23.4%
20.5%
Source: Independent Institute of Socioeconomic and Political Studies 2012
Lukashenka has also alluded to establishing economic and political links with
countries such as Iran, Venezuela and China, in an effort to locate new sources of
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investment and to underline the country’s political and strategic independence from both
its neighbors (Melyantsou 2012, 100 and Nice 2012, 9). These circumstances suggest
that Belarus is being pulled strongly into the Russian orbit, and is considering other
alternatives outside of its region as well; the alternatives it is considering though may
portend a negative turn for democratization if Belarus looks only to similarly
undemocratic nations with which to partner. The EU will have to provide a significant
list of incentives in order to compete.

Conclusion
This chapter has presented an overview of the extant literature on democracy
promotion and international democratic diffusion. It began with a comparison of the
internal and external actors influential in bringing about (or impeding) democratic
transitions, followed by a discussion of democracy promotion as a type of diffusion
process. This process is largely dependent upon the amount of linkage and leverage
existing between two polities, and an adequate level of each must be attained in order for
an external actor to meaningfully impact a domestic one. In the case of the EU and
Belarus, the low level of linkage (of business contacts, diplomatic ties, information flows,
etc.) and existence of an alternative, countervailing force acting against Europe’s points
of leverage with Belarus have created a less than ideal scenario for European democracy
promotion in the country.
It was also argued that democratic diffusion occurs most frequently (and most
successfully) at the neighbor state and/or the transnational network levels. While these
entities may employ a variety of mechanisms to persuade a state to undertake democratic
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reforms, the one most frequently (and most effectively) used by the European Union is
conditionality. The EU has been relatively successful in its use of this strategy for
incentivizing states to democratize: for example, in Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and
Estonia.
Belarus’ reluctance to democratize casts it as an exception to many widely
accepted theories of European democratization. While Belarus tends to find itself in a
position similar to that of many these former autocratic regimes within its region, it has
yet to undergo any significant amount of democratic reform. I have suggested a potential
explanation (or partial explanation) for Belarus’ outlier status as being the country’s close
relationship with Russia; however a more in-depth look at the specific European
democracy promotion policies, the circumstances in which they were established, and the
reactions of Belarus to them is necessary for achieving a more in-depth understanding of
the matter.
From the evidence presented thus far, it is clear that democracy promotion theory
alone does not account for the low level of democratization in Belarus. Internal factors
(i.e. socio-economic conditions) cannot explain it; however external factors, such as
Belarus’ high level of trade interdependence with Europe and its close proximity to
European states and frequent interactions with the EU as a democratic, supranational
entity may provide insight into the country’s potential for democratic change. Russia’s
influence on Belarus may be a possible partial reason for Belarus’ current low levels of
democracy; but the European Union is an equally powerful neighbor with the capacity to
provide an impressive package of incentives to Belarus to democratize. These facts
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would lead me to hypothesize that the European Union has the potential to impact the
level of democracy in Belarus. In the next chapter, this will be further analyzed.
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CHAPTER 3
ANALYSIS OF CONDITIONALITY-STRUCTURED
EU DEMOCRACY PROMOTION POLICIES IN BELARUS
.
I established in the previous chapter that the European Union acts as an external
agent of democracy promotion, encouraging democratic transitions in its neighborhood
by exercising its economic and political weight. It may elect to employ negative
measures, like sanctions, or positive ones, like political conditionality in its endeavors.
Conditionality, as has been explained, may be understood as the “linkage between
European Union’s demands to a third country focused on reforms in a certain policy area,
and incentives such as subsidies or access to EU funds” (Fedirko 2013, 3) and is the core
mechanism of many EU agreements, including those concluded between EU candidate
countries and post-soviet states. The purpose of this chapter will be to analyze the impact
of specific, conditionality-based policies of the European Union on the level of
democracy in Belarus.
To carry out this investigation, I will consider three major policies designed to
promote democracy in Belarus: the European Neighborhood Policy, the Eastern
Partnership, and the Dialogue on Modernization. The decision to focus on these specific
measures lies in the fact that they are each a relevant example of how the EU uses
conditionality requirements to structure its relations with third parties such as Belarus.
For each, I will consider: the EU’s declared objectives, the incentives for Belarus to
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participate in the policy, the disincentives for Belarusian participation, and the observed
impact they had on the progress of democratization in Belarus. Firstly, though, I will
further detail my methodological approach.

Methodology
Having now presented a summary of the theories around which my arguments are
based, it is time to focus on data analysis. The data presented in this chapter will
constitute a case study whereby a case is defined as a “political, social, institutional, or
individual entities or phenomena about which information is collected and inferences are
made,” (Seawright and Collier 2004, 275). In accordance with the definition given by
Seawright and Collier (2004, 276), my attention is focused on the detailed contextual
knowledge of a specific case (that of Belarus) and how variables (notably, EU democracy
promotion policies) interact within the context of this particular case.
Moreover, I conduct within-case analysis in that I concentrate my attention on
internal evidence about patterns of causation connected with the overall levels of
democracy achieved which may be distinctively associated with the democracy
promotion policies of the EU (based on Seawright and Collier’s definition [2004, 312]). I
am therefore making one observation on the dependent variable (democratization in
Central and Eastern Europe since the end of Communism) and holding the regime, which
has remained under Lukashenka’s control for the time period discussed, constant. The
level of democracy in Belarus has also remained relatively constant, as the Freedom
House and Polity IV data illustrate. My independent variable will be the types of
democracy promotion policies devised by the EU. The additional evidence supported by
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the data I have collected will help in the analysis of whether or not a particular type of
relationship can be observed between the dependent and independent variables.
To render my analysis more concise, I have chosen to situate it within a certain
timeframe. In this case, I have considered data beginning from 2002 to the present. The
year 2002 was chosen as a starting point because it followed closely the contentious
Belarusian presidential and parliamentary elections of 2001, which were deemed to be
highly undemocratic by international democracy organizations such as Freedom House
(Freedom House 2013). As was explained in the introductory chapter, a state’s level of
democracy is (arguably) a measurable variable; considering both Freedom House and
Polity IV data is one way in which I have sought to increase the measurement validity of
this thesis. These numbers, though, do not reflect the entire context of what constitutes
democracy, as was explained in the substantive definitions of democracy. Factors such
as freedom in the media and the fairness of elections are less quantifiable, yet essential to
consider when evaluating Belarus’ true level of democracy.
I will apply inductive reasoning to the information I have gathered in order to
support the observations about the relation between EU policy and democracy levels in
Central and Eastern Europe that I make throughout this chapter. The data I will present
comes from a variety of political science databases, books, and journals; government
document archives and official government websites; online periodicals; as well as polls
and data produced by non-governmental organizations such as Freedom House.
As mentioned above, the purpose of this thesis is to consider how two variables
(EU democracy promotion policies and levels of democracy in Central and Eastern
Europe) are related. While the data presented herein does not suffice to make a causal
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argument, I believe it is sufficient to allow for observations which might later be used in
a more in-depth, comparative study to develop causal inferences about EU democracy
promotion in post-Soviet states. Causal inferences, according to King, Keohane, and
Verba (1994, 81-85), are useful for political scientists when a multitude of variables are
influencing an outcome and the argument that the outcome resulted solely from the
variable(s) being measured by the scientist is overly simplified. Certainly, there are a host
of other agents which have played a role in Belarus’ observed level of democracy
compared to that of other Central and Eastern European countries over the course of the
past decade; however that does not mean it is impossible to make certain observations
about the impact of European Union democracy promotion efforts. Analyzing the
changes (or lack thereof) in levels of impact from one EU policy to the next (i.e. the
progression from little to no success with the ENP to limited success with the EaP to
clear indicators of progress with the DoM) allow me to assess how these policies differ
from one another, and to postulate which democracy promotion methods suggest higher
chances of bringing about democratic progress.

European Neighborhood Policy
The European Union introduced the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) with
the Communication of the Commission entitled “Wider Europe-Neighbourhood – A New
Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours” in March 2003
(Commission 2003). This was followed by a Strategy Paper in May 2004, which further
detailed the mechanisms and functionality of the European Neighborhood Policy
Instrument (ENPI) (Vysotskaya 2008, 2). The ENP framework was proposed for 16
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countries, and provided the opportunity for those countries to engage in bilateral
partnerships with the EU. These involved Action Plans that set an agenda of economic
and political reform which, if successful, offered the possibility of being rewarded by
European integration, though not at full member level (Prodi 2006).
The Union’s stated objective in establishing this policy is “to provide a
framework for the development of a new relationship” (Commission 2004, 5).
Furthermore, it is interested in preventing the reformation of divisions in the European
area (Vysotskaya 2008, 3), and “developing a zone of prosperity and a friendly
neighbourhood... with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and cooperative relations”
(Commission 2004, 4). By launching the ENP, the EU established a unified approach for
“promoting reform, sustainable development and trade” (Commission 2003, 4) in its
border states.
Incentives
Under the auspices of the ENP, the EU offers partnering countries incentives in
the way of economic cooperation and sectorial integration (Vysotskaya 2008, 4) by
granting a promise to neighboring states that they may one day join the EU internal
market:
“…all the neighboring countries should be offered the prospect of a stake in the
EU’s internal market and further integration and liberalization to promote the free
movement of persons, goods, services and capital…”
(Commission 2003, 5)
The areas of cooperation specifically outlined in the Commission Communication of
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2003 include the: promotion of human rights; further cultural cooperation and promotion
of mutual understanding; extension of internal market and regulatory structures;
preferential trading relations and market opening; integration into transport, energy and
telecommunication network; perspectives for lawful migration and movement of persons,
intensified cooperation to prevent and combat common security threats, cooperation in
the area of security and justice as well as collaboration on an energy dialogue
(Commission 2003, 10-14).
It is important to note the absence of one incentive which may be considered even
more appealing than integration into the European economic market: the prospect of
accession. It is explicitly stated in the Commission document that the ENP does “not, in
the medium-term, include a perspective of membership or a role in the Union’s
institutions. A response to the practical issues posed by proximity and neighborhood
should be seen as separate from the question of EU accession” (Commission 2003, 5).
The European Parliament (2003) has pointed out though that the ENP is in no way
incompatible with aspirations to EU membership, citing Article 49 of the Treaty on
European Union which declares that any European state respecting the principles of
liberty, democracy, human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, may apply
to become a member of the Union. Thus, the option of accession is not specifically
excluded by the ENP, but no concrete targets or dates were therein stipulated, nor were
any promises of membership made.
Conditions: Disincentives
The ENP lays out not only a list of incentives for partner countries, but also
stipulates that countries must meet certain requirements in order to participate. In the
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document setting the grounds for the European Neighborhood Policy Instrument, Article
1, Section 3 states: “The European Union is founded on the values of liberty, democracy,
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law and seeks to
promote commitment of these values in partner countries through dialogue and
cooperation.” Article 28 sets out that “where a partner country fails to observe the
principles referred to in Article 1, the Council… may take appropriate steps in respect of
any Community assistance granted to the partner country under this Regulation” and “in
such cases, Community assistance shall primarily be used to support non-state actors for
measures aimed at promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms and supporting the
democratization process in partner countries” (Commission 2004, 1 & 14). Similar to
accession arrangements, the Union here has outlined the conditions which must be met to
participate in its ENP, what disqualifies a country from the Partnership, and when the EU
will elect instead to support NGO’s and other non-state actors in a partner country.
At the time the EU was formulating its neighbourhood policy in 2003 and 2004,
Belarusian President Lukashenka held a “grotesquely flawed” referendum in which he
guaranteed his chance of being elected as president for life (Dura 2008, 1). The lack of
democratic reforms in Belarus and the government’s violation of the most basic human
rights meant that Belarus was excluded from the European Neighbourhood Policy and no
Action Plan was settled (Dura 2008). Consequently, no specifics were mentioned
regarding the reforms Belarus would have to make, or the extent to which they must
uphold the rule of law and respect human rights. The EU therefore released a paper
detailing specific requirements for Belarus’ participation in the ENP in 2006. The EU
demanded that Belarus’ government:
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• Respect the right of the people of Belarus to elect their leaders democratically –
their right to hear all views and see all election candidates; the right of
opposition candidates to campaign without harassment, prosecution or
imprisonment; independent observation of the elections
• Respect the right of the people of Belarus to independent information, and to
express themselves freely, i.e. by allowing journalists to work without
harassment or prosecution, not shutting down newspapers or preventing their
distribution.
• Respect the rights of non-governmental organizations by no longer hindering
their legal existence, harassing and prosecuting members of NGOs, and
allowing them to receive international assistance.
• Release all political prisoners – members of democratic opposition parties,
members of NGOs and ordinary citizens arrested at peaceful demonstrations or
meetings.
(Commission 2006)
Other rights demanded by the EU included those of workers, of national minorities, and
the abolition of the death penalty, for example (Commission 2006).
The terms of conditionality have been clearly established. The European Union’s
demands must be met if Belarus hopes to take advantage of the incentives it offers:
“In return for concrete progress demonstrating shared values and effective
implementation of political, economic and institutional reforms, including
aligning legislation with the acquis, the EU’s neighbourhood should benefit from
the prospect of closer economic integration with the EU.”
(Commission 2003, p.5).
Speaking especially on the matter of Belarusian involvement in the Neighborhood Policy,
the Commission has made it clear that the:
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“Development of closer relations between the EU and Belarus will depend on
Belarus' effective implementation of further reforms, its willingness to respect its
international commitments and to adopt European standards of democracy and
human rights.”
(European Commission 2003 in Vysotskaya 2008, 11)

Responses and Impacts
Belarus’ response to the ENP made clear that cooperation with EU on issues of
mutual interest, in particular that of their common border, was viewed as equally
beneficial for both parties: “Belarus has been a serious guarantor of regional stability in
the fields… [of] illegal migration, drag trafficking, trans-border criminality, human
trafficking. And here we offer a real cooperation to… the European Union,” (Martynov
2004). Belarusian officials have also issued statements indicating the country’s
willingness to cooperate with the EU while at the same time excluding the possibility that
such cooperation could be conditioned by the Union:
“We are offering the EU and its member states cooperation and partnership. We
are offering, and not asking for it. We are no rich country, but we have something
to offer for a sincere and honest cooperation with the “European House.”
(Ambassador of the Republic of Belarus in Vysotskaya 2008, 12)
At the same time, though, Belarus also expressed its need for European financial
assistance, especially aid on issues of illegal immigration: “...we won't be able to meet
our commitments to the international community, because we have no funds,"
Lukashenka said. "Fighting illegal migration costs tens of millions of [U.S.] dollars,”
(quoted in Vysotskaya 2008, 14). For the EU, an increase of financing to Belarus as a
result of common threats has presented the Union with a difficult decision. Any
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rapprochement between the positions of the EU and Belarus would be in contradiction
with the envisaged conditionality principle. On the one hand, the EU explicitly states that
assistance to Belarus is dependent on the progress of democratization, economic reforms,
and free and fair elections. On the other hand, cooperation with Belarus – e.g. on border
controls – is in the interest of the EU itself (Vysotskaya 2008).
After the fraudulent presidential elections of March 2006, the freeze of assets and
visa bans were extended more widely to include high-ranking government members and
also President Lukashenka (Potocki 2011). At the end of 2006, the EU widened its
sanctions to include the withdrawal its preferential trading agreement, the Generalized
System of Preferences (GSP) for trade with Belarus (Bosse 2012a). That same year, the
EU emphasized its continued interest in improving bilateral relations with Belarus by
publishing its unofficial action plan, “What the European Union could bring to Belarus,”
whereby the EU set out a number of requirements for advances in human rights and the
rule of law in Belarus (described above). The paper was addressed to the people of
Belarus (an obvious attempt to snub the country’s leaders) (Dura 2008).
The EU also highlighted advantages Belarus might enjoy from cooperation with
Europe, such as: easier travel, increased trade and investment, cooperation in a number of
sectorial policies (environment, transport and energy), cultural and educational
exchanges, etc. (Commission 2006). Furthermore, European officials explained to the
Belarusian population that their country could not be included in the ENP or benefit from
closer ties with the EU if their government did not carry out the necessary democratic
reforms. The EU also pledged continued support for the broadcasting of independent TV
and radio programs to Belarus and support for Belarusian students studying in the EU
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(Commission 2006).
The non-paper indicated significant moral support for the Belarusian opposition,
adding an element of external legitimacy to their stance against Lukashenka’s regime.
Despite the fact that opposition activists have promoted the document in rallies and
marches, so far the non-paper seems to have passed largely unnoticed by the wider
Belarusian population (Dura 2008). Lukashenka responded with a statement in strong
opposition to the EU.
He suggested that the EU was attempting to infringe upon Belarusian sovereignty
and that he would not allow it. He asserted that Belarus protected European countries
from illegal migration, international crime, and drug trafficking, thereby implying that the
EU had much to gain from Belarus and attempting to increase his sense of leverage in the
relationship (Lukashenka 2006). Lukashenka did not appear to attach much real
significance to the paper though, as attested by the local elections several weeks after its
release, in January 2007, which fell short of democratic standards and where excessive
repressive measures were taken against the opposition (Dura 2008). These actions led to
a cooling in Belarus-EU relations. IISEPS polls from 2012 indicate that from 2006
onwards, the opinion of Belarusian society toward EU membership has been less than
enthusiastic (IISEPS 2012).

Belarusian Attitudes toward the EU and Russia
For or Against EU
membership
For
Against
Don’t know/No opinion

	
  

2002
60.9%
10.9%
28.2%

2005
52.8%
44.4%
2.8%
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2008
26.7%
51.9%
21.4%

2011
45.1%
30.5%
34.4%

Source: Independent Institute of Socioeconomic and Political Studies 2012

Critiques
As previously mentioned, many scholars have found membership prospects to be
a major factor in determining the effectiveness of European conditionality (Dimitrova &
Pridham 2004, Ethier 2003 and Yilmaz 2009). The ENP was effectively “accession
conditionality without accession” (Wolczuk 2009, 188 quoted in Fedirko 2013, 3).
Accordingly, a major critique of the ENP is that it does not offer neighboring countries
the prospect of EU membership; it does not provide guarantees for tangible economic
benefits stemming from membership. This reduces the economic stimulus for market
reforms and democratization, as has been evident in neighboring Ukraine in addition to
Belarus (Fedirko 2013, 3 and Lahviniec & Papko 2010, 253). The smaller the EU’s
metaphorical carrot becomes, the less leverage it has to influence Belarus to begin
democratic reforms. Furthermore, certain scholars and activists critique the ENP for its
lack of benchmarking and making explicit the types of democratic reforms it expects
partner countries to make (Fedirko 2013, 6). Without clearly defined expectations, it is
unlikely that a country will achieve much success in furthering democratic goals.
An additional point of weakness (which Lahviniec and Papko (2010) suggest is
the main one) in determining the efficiency of the EU’s policy vis-à-vis its undemocratic
neighbors is the existence of geopolitical alternatives. The ENP is built upon a
Eurocentric world-view. For those who crafted the ENP, the EU was obviously perceived
as the most attractive economic and political entity in the region. Europeans, at least as
reflected through suggested policies such as the ENP, have tended to assume that political
elites in neighboring countries understand the EU to be the only player in town capable of
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saving them from their problems, whether issues of unemployment or poverty or
economic development challenges. But this is not always the case, particularly during a
time of global economic crisis, and particularly when the EU has not proven itself to be
especially adept at combatting this crisis. Certain Eastern European countries, such as
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, have tended to view Russia as a threat
warranting suspicion; consequently, they have tended to favor partnerships with the West
(i.e. NATO & the EU) as a way of balancing Russian influence in the region
(Schimmelfennig 1998, 205). However other states, such as Moldova, Ukraine, and
Belarus have historically chosen instead to partner with Russia, whose natural resources,
political endorsements and economic power have propped them up since the fall of
Communism (Schimmelfennig 2007, 134). No ruling elite in Belarus or Ukraine would
agree to introduce EU-based reforms if countervailing forces (such as Russia, as
previously discussed) offered economic and political gains without demanding political
reforms in exchange (Lahviniec & Papko 2010, 253). Such criticisms and the overall
lack of effectiveness of the ENP prompted the European Union to devise an alternative
framework for cooperation with Belarus.
Eastern Partnership
The European Union’s “new and improved” neighborhood framework, the
Eastern Partnership (EaP) was launched in May 2009 at the Prague Summit, after a year
of preparation. In March 2008, Poland and Sweden introduced a proposal for the Eastern
Partnership, in the hopes of encouraging future governments to continue developing the
ENP in bilateral and multilateral formats (particularly in the Eastern neighborhood). The
targeted countries were Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine to the East, and Armenia,
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Azerbaijan, and Georgia to the South (Council 2009). The proposal was quickly ratified
by the EU partners, with the war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 giving
additional impetus to the EU’s internal discussions on Eastern and Neighborhood
policies. In May 2009, Belarus was invited to join the multilateral track of the Eastern
Partnership (EaP), and it has participated actively since then (European Union 2012, 7).
The main objective of the Eastern Partnership is to create the necessary conditions
to accelerate political association and further economic integration between the European
Union and interested partner countries for the purposes of stability and multilateral
confidence building (Council 2009):
“The Eastern Partnership seeks to support political and socio-economic reforms in
partner countries, facilitating approximation towards the European Union. This
serves the shared commitment to stability, security and prosperity of the European
Union, the partner countries and indeed the entire European continent.”
(Council 2009)
One of the EU’s longer-term goals is: “the establishment of a deep and
comprehensive free trade area (DCFTA) with and among the partners that could lead to
deeper integration with the EU’s economy and could grow into a Neighbourhood
Economic Community” (Council 2009, 5). The Commission, in its drafting of the
original proposal also set forth aspirations regarding visa liberalization, more active
cooperation in the field of energy security and sectorial reforms (Commission 2008).
Four thematic platforms for cooperation have been defined in order to assist in the
meeting of these goals: 1) Democracy, good governance and stability; 2) Economic
integration and convergence with EU sectorial policies; 3) Energy security; and 4)
Contacts between people (Council 2009, 9).
Incentives
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The Eastern Partnership offers to partner countries a number of ways to benefit
from cooperation with the European Union. First, and significant for Belarus, is the issue
of mobility. The Prague Declaration includes promises of visa liberalization as a longterm goal (on a case-by-case basis). While visa-free travel is not specified in this
document as a long-term goal, the notion of liberalizing the EU’s visa regime with
partner countries could help approximate the countries’ economies as well as their
societies to EU standards in the diffusion process (Vegh 2012, 29-30). Second, it is
worth noting that in this agreement the EU has expressed its desire to “operate on a basis
of joint decisions of the European Union and the partner countries” and to “facilitate the
development of common positions and joint activities” (Council 2009, 7). This is an
important statement, particularly for countries such as Belarus because it indicates that
the EU is not only operating on the basis of European demands, but is participating in a
dialogue with partner countries and is willing to listen to their concerns as well.
Third, the Eastern Partnership seeks to enhance economic cooperation with
partner countries via a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA). The
DCFTA is more than a normal free trade agreement; it concerns not only the
liberalization of trade in all areas by lifting customs barriers and trade quotas, but also the
harmonization of the partner countries’ trade-related legislation with EU standards and
the acquis communautaire (Eastern Partnership Community 2013).
The real added value of the Eastern Partnership though is its multilateral
framework, which seeks to promote a regional approach within the framework of the
European Neighbourhood Policy, something previously overlooked. What is significant
for Belarus is that the multilateral dimension of this policy instrument provides an
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opportunity for Belarus to participate in the program (Vegh 2012, 28). As explained in
the discussion on the ENP, Belarus had, up to this point, been excluded from bilateral
cooperation with the EU within the Neighborhood framework. The multilateral
framework is further intended to foster links among partner countries themselves and
serves as a forum for discussion on further developments of the Eastern Partnership
(Council 2009). It might also prove to be a useful tool of confidence building in
overcoming difficult relations among partner states in the region (Vegh 2012 20). The
four thematic platforms of the Eastern Partnership are meant to offer stakeholders with
flexible spaces of discussion, where experiences, best practices and lessons-learned can
be shared, compared, and spread among those who need them to support their own
efforts.
The multilateral track is also complemented by a civil dimension, the Eastern
Partnership’s Civil Society Forum (CSF). Recognizing the importance of socialization in
the transformation process, the Commission (2008) called for the establishment of the
CSF with the goal of bringing together NGOs, think-tanks, national and international
civil society actors from the EU and partner countries to work on the approximation of
societies and also to make more resources available for the region. Additionally,
EURONEST is the parliamentary dimension of the EaP aimed at promoting dialogue and
exchanges between members of parliament in the EU and EaP countries and at
encouraging democratic reforms, the rule of law and good governance in all partner
countries (Commission 2010). The European Parliament has denied the legitimacy of
Belarus’ Parliament due to unfair and repressive electoral practices (European Parliament
2011), which is why there has been pressure on the involvement of civil society
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representatives in most Euro-Belarus frameworks. This parliamentary dimension thus
serves as “the voice of Belarusian society” for the EU, in that it projects an opinion on
country-specific issues, that its opinion is viewed by the EU as more legitimate than the
official doctrine put forth by the Lukashenka regime, and it is capable of voicing this
opinion on the international stage (Commission 2013).

Conditions: Disincentives
The Eastern Partnership is based on the existing conditionality restrictions
governing bilateral relations of the EU and partner countries in the ENP (Council 2009).
The values and practices underlined in the Partnership agreement reflect many of those
found in the language of the Neighborhood Policy texts:
The participants of the Prague Summit agree that the Eastern Partnership will be
based on commitments to the principles of international law and to fundamental
values, including democracy, the rule of law and the respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms, as well as to, market economy, sustainable development
and good governance.” (Council 2009, 6). The Eastern Partnership carries a “clear
political message about the need to maintain and bolster the course towards
reforms.
(Council 2009, 3)
Additionally, legislative and regulatory approximation are highlighted as crucial
indicators of partner countries’ willingness to engage in reforms necessary to enhancing
their relations with the EU. The multilateral framework in particular is intended to
provide a forum for implementing such measures through dedicated sessions devoted to
the presentation and explanation by the European Union of EU legislation and standards,
as well as its comparisons to partner states’ national policy and legislative practices
(Council 2009, 8).
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Regarding certain aspects of economic conditionality, the European Union has
made clear that open markets and economic integration are “essential to the sustainable
economic development of the partner countries and to underpin political stabilization”
(Commission 2009, 7). Furthermore, for a partner country to be allowed to negotiate its
participation in the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, membership of the World
Trade Organization is required; therefore Azerbaijan and Belarus, neither of which are
WTO members, cannot start negotiations on DCFTA with the EU (Eastern Partnership
Community 2013).
When it comes to Belarus’ participation in the project, it was initially stated that
this country would be involved at a technical and experts level with the possibility for
future enhancement (Marples 2009). After holding several high-level EU-Belarus
meetings and issuing an invitation for president Lukashenka for the Prague summit in
May 2009, the European Union offered a full partnership with Belarus provided that
Belarus takes concrete and convincing steps towards democratization, respect for human
rights and the rule of law. Until this requirement is met, Belarus will be restricted to the
multilateral track of the EaP (Emphasis made by Marples [2009], substantiated by
conclusions made by the Council of the European Union [2009]). Steps by the Belarusian
authorities to address the country’s democratic governance shortcomings have remained
limited; as a result, it has so far not been possible for the EU to engage in partnership
negotiations. At the same time, contacts at the technical level on issues of mutual interest
are still encouraged (Commission 2008).
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Response and Impacts
Belarus’ representation at the opening summit of the EaP in Prague was the first
time Belarus formally participated in a regular component of the European Neighborhood
Policy (Lahniviec 2010). Belarus’ response to the initiative indicated that it viewed the
EaP as “another step to boost pragmatic co-operation with the countries in the European
Union’s immediate neighbourhood.” The foreign ministry expressed its will to work
“…in conjunction with the European Commission to mold the Eastern Partnership…
along a number of mutually beneficial directions including trade, energy, transport, crossborder crime, environment, and agriculture” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belarus
2009).
Pursuant to the Eastern Partnership’s entering into force, contacts between highranking Belarusian and European officials were revitalized and intensified. Talks were
held among the “troika” of EU foreign ministers and Belarus representatives: EU High
representative Javier Solana met with President Lukashenka in February 2009, and in
June 2009 the Commissioner for Trade and European Neighborhood Policy, Benita
Ferrero-Waldner, travelled to Minsk (Bosse 2012). In 2009 the External Relations
Council also agreed on the suspension of travel restrictions being applied to certain
Belarusian officials. Simultaneously, the Council proposed a visa-facilitation and
readmission agreement to Belarus and the initiating of an Action Plan agreement (in the
Joint Interim Plan), actions indicating a new EU approach of functional cooperation with
Belarus (Bosse 2012a).
Lukashenka voiced his appreciation of the positive steps taken by the EU in an
interview with Euronews TV, in which he spoke positively of the warming of relations
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between Belarus and the EU and claimed that he was open to dialogue on subjects of
freedom of the press and election legislation (Lukshenka 2009). The first round of EUBelarus talks on human rights began in mid-2009. The EU and Belarus also held joint
technical talks on energy, the environment, agriculture, customs and transport, along with
a discussion of norms and standards (Bosse 2012). These meetings, as well as the host of
financial assistance packages promised to Belarus by the EU on matters of economic
development and cross-border management, for example, prompted Belarus to adopt a
more pro-European rhetoric from 2009 into 2010 (Lahviniec 2010).
The EU responded by taking significant steps to support the integration of Belarus
into the Eastern Partnership. A Council resolution has asked the European Commission to
prepare recommendations to establish negotiation guidelines for the relaxation and
reversal of the visa ban. A kind of counterpart to the Neighborhood Action Plan, known
as a Joint Interim Plan, was suggested in 2009, laying out specific priorities for reform in
the country (EU Council 2009). Brussels declared that it would offer Belarus economic
aid in the form of loans and grants, and would also develop political relations by signing
and implementing a Joint Interim Plan (the equivalent of an Action Plan from the
European Neighbourhood Policy), provided that the December 2010 elections were held
democratically (Ananicz 2011). The eruption of violence after the 2010 presidential
elections and the human rights abuses committed by the Belarusian government forced
HR/VP Catherine Ashton to call for a halt in discussions of the Joint Interim Plan in 2011
(Ashton 2011). The Plan was not abolished, nor was it expressly placed back on the
EU’s agenda.
The violence and flagrant disregard for democracy and human rights
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demonstrated by Lukashenka’s actions during and after the presidential elections of 2010
indicated a dramatic turning point in EU-Belarus relations. The EU once again instituted
visa bans against offending Belarusian officials, and shifted its focus to engagement with
civil society and opposition groups, as opposed to the Belarusian government (Ashton
2011). In June 2011, the Commission offered Belarus to start negotiations on visa
facilitation and readmission agreements to the benefit of the population at large (thereby
keeping with the EU’s emphasis on strengthening its relations with civil society)
(Commission 2012). The Belarusian authorities did not respond to the offer. In the
absence of a response, the 23 March 2012 Foreign Affairs Council in its conclusions
welcomed the intention of EU Member States to unilaterally make optimal use of the
existing flexibilities offered by the Visa Code, in particular the possibilities to waive and
reduce visa fees for certain categories of Belarusian citizens or in individual cases
(Commission 2012).
Although the extent of Belarus’s participation in the bilateral track of the Eastern
Partnership continues to depend on internal developments in Belarus, the EU set aside
additional Eastern Partnership funding for Belarus for 2012-2013, amounting to an
additional €15.19 million (on top of the already programmed €41.50 million), for
Comprehensive Institutional Building and Pilot Regional Development Programs
(Commission 2013). Bilateral relations are targeted at supporting cooperation in sectors
of mutual interest (environment, energy efficiency, food security, etc) and put emphasis
on encouraging civil society’s participation. The EaP funds are conditional though, and
allow for the reallocation of those funds if, at the time of implementing the NIP, there has
not been enough progress in the country to justify the inclusion of Belarus in the bilateral
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track of the EaP (Commission 2013).
The Civil Society Forum created under the scope of the EaP has been proved a
crucial step in reinforcing the EU’s commitment to engage with Belarusian civil society.
Giselle Bosse (2012a) reports that Belarusian experts have seen fairly significant effects
as a result of the CSF, largely in helping Belarusian NGOs organize themselves again
after the 2010 crackdown, and opposition groups’ participation in dialogues to adopt
common positions. One of the greatest weaknesses of opposition groups in 2010 was the
fact that they were so divided; the potential for the CSF to serve as a platform for
bridging gaps in political stances is of critical value to strengthening plurality in the
Belarusian political sphere (Bosse 2012a).
It is worth mentioning though that the exclusion of the Belarusian government
from frameworks such as the CSF have occasionally resulted in negative repercussions
for those engaging in them; for example, at the end of 2009 a group of opposition youth
activists were abducted by unidentified (government) individuals and detained for a time,
and in 2010 a female student was censured by the Belarusian State University because of
her unauthorized participation in the Civil Society Forum (FRIDE 2012). The
government’s attempts to stifle participation in these bodies has not been successful, as
220 civil society organizations participated in this framework in 2012 (Commission
2013).
Dialogue on Modernization
The Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy Štefan
Füle on 29 March 2012 at an event in Brussels launched a European Dialogue on
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Modernization with Belarusian society (Dyner 2012). The Dialogue is a way for Europe
to further its relations with Belarus since its draft Joint Interim Plan was put on hold as a
result of the political situation in the country (Füle 2013). To date, the Dialogue on
Modernization (DoM) is the only institutionalized framework between the EU and
Belarus carrying a bilateral dimension (Commission 2013).
Within the European dialogue the EU and its Member States discuss with
representatives of the Belarusian opposition and civil society the necessary reforms for
the modernization of Belarus and the potential development of Belarusian relations with
the EU. The DoM was designed to tackle four major themes: 1) political dialogue and
political reforms; 2) legal reform and internal affairs; 3) economic and social reforms,
and 4) trade and regulatory reforms (Commission 2012). The overarching objective of
the project is of course to develop comprehensive solutions for the modernization of
Belarus (Dyner 2012). Another purpose of the program is to support civil society,
independent media, and students expelled from universities for political activities. These
actions are intended to prevent the isolation of Belarus and its citizens in the international
arena as a result of the policies of the authorities in Minsk (Dyner 2012). Another goal of
the project is to transfer to Belarusians practical knowledge about the transition
experiences of EU Member States (Commission 2012).

Incentives
One enticing aspect of the dialogue is its emphasis on working with the
Belarusian public and civil society. An active involvement of Belarusians in defining the
objectives and procedures of the Dialogue on Modernization provides Belarusians a sense
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of ownership of the initiative. It also ensures that the process is not a unilateral one
where the EU determines which domestic issues are to be prioritized; the notion of a real
dialogue between the two partners allows Belarusians to express their own vision of
current challenges and urgent domestic concerns that need to be addressed (Melyantsou
2012).
Furthermore, the emphasis placed on modernizing the Belarusian economy is one
that resonates both with the Belarusian public and the state. From 2009 to 2011 Belarus
suffered a severe economic crisis, resulting in government fears of not being able to
provide its citizens with enough social benefits to satisfy them (Melyantsou 2012).
Belarus has been forced to apply for loans from international bodies such as the
International Monetary Fund and the Eurasian Economic Community (Dyner 2012). The
number of people in Belarus who recognize the need for economic reform totaled 67
percent in 2012 (IIPSEPS 2012), indicating that the public at large would support reform
measures. The country is in a weak economic position and knows it needs to make
changes; the prospect for European aid in making certain sectors more competitive
through modernization efforts is therefore very appealing.

Conditions: Disincentives
The European Dialogue for Modernization, while allowing for bilateral relations
between the EU and Belarus, is not an attempt to unfreeze relations between the EU and
Lukashenka’s government. Under the Dialogue, the participation of certain government
agencies in the Dialogue activities is permitted, though only in a non-formal, unofficial
and ad-hoc nature (Commission 2012). The primary condition for resuming any broad
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high-level cooperation with Belarus within the context of the DoM, according to the
European Union, is the release of political prisoners and their full rehabilitation (Yahorau
& Zuokova 2012). At the launch of the Dialogue in Brussels in March 2012, Belarusian
civil society and opposition groups were heavily represented; a majority of government
officials who may have been invited to the launch were unable to participate due to their
names being on the EU’s visa black list (Füle 2012).

Response and Impacts
Since the Dialogue’s creation, expert working groups have been formed in each of
the four major themes established in the DoM; these groups have defined the thematic
priorities of modernization reforms and have developed plans for future work related to
their preparation (primarily in the form of conferences and seminars) (Coordination
Committee of the National Platform 2013). Several joint meetings of the expert groups,
political parties, Belarusian civil society organizations, and European diplomats have
been held in Belarus and meetings on DoM themes have been held in a number of the EU
member states (Commission 2013). The Dialogue has thus provided a welcome space for
civil society discussion on issues pertinent to modernization efforts in Belarus (Yahorau
& Zuikova 2012). The stronger voice and legitimacy it has given to Belarusian civil
society undeniably increases its bargaining position with the Belarusian authorities: if the
EU is only willing to speak with civil society members, then the Belarusian government
will eventually have to engage with those members if it hopes to have its needs and
objectives toward the EU met. This point was emphasized when members of
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Lukashenka’s government proposed the state’s participation in the Dialogue in February
2013.
The Belarusian authorities sent the proposals to the Member States on the new
format of the Dialogue on Modernization, which would be limited to interstate relations
without the political opposition and civil society engagement (Commission 2013). This
move suggests Lukashenka’s regime does not like the added weight being bestowed upon
civil society by the EU, and intends to minimize it by trying to take over the
representation of Belarus in the DoM. It is important to note that these proposals by the
Belarusian authorities have not been not accompanied with any sort of demonstration of
their good will to cooperate with the EU (Committee of the National Platform 2013).
Authorities have still not released more than ten of the political prisoners whose liberty
the EU has specifically requested, despite the fact that this step is necessary before any
kind of negotiations process may begin (Commission 2013). The Belarusian
representatives of civil society have expressed their hopes that the EU will not accept the
proposals of the Belarusian authorities:
In our opinion, the creation of separate relationships of the EU with the state
would de facto mean the exclusion of civil society from the real modernisation
process. Since there is no freedom for the civil society activity in the country, it
cannot function to influence the government decisions and monitor the
government activities without a special dialogue format.
(Coordination Committee of the National Platform 2013)
The European Union thus far has not indicated any desire to take Belarusian authorities
up on their offer of engagement and have largely ignored these proposals. They have
opted instead to issue official statements highlighting the need for Belarus to release
political prisoners and adhere to democratic principles and respect for human rights and
the rule of law before further discussion can be made (Ashton 2012, Füle 2012). The fact
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that the parliamentary elections in Belarus in fall 2012 were conducted under repressive
conditions and were reportedly fraudulent indicates that the first few months of the
Dialogue were not successful in bringing about meaningful steps toward democratization
(Commission 2012). More time is needed to make any meaningful assessment, though.

Critiques
A key concern of European and Belarusian policy-makers and scholars about the
prospect for the effectiveness of the Dialogue on Modernization has been the state’s lack
of involvement in the process. While the Union is commendably upholding its principle
that any bilateral relationship with Belarus will only take place if Belarus adheres to
European demands of releasing political prisoners, the capacity of the Dialogue to bring
about any substantial reforms may be called into question. The state is the chief
implementer of any democratic reforms which may take place in the country (Melyantsou
2012). Without engaging the state in the elaboration of reform proposals, it is therefore
unlikely that transformations in the economic and governmental sector will take place.
Additionally, the state tends to be the entity endowed with data and information
pertaining to the current conditions of economic sectors, etc. Working solely with civil
researchers who do not have access to hard numbers necessary for planning and
evaluating reform projects is thus insufficient; this has been recognized to some extent in
the Dialogue with the inclusion of government officials on an ad-hoc basis, however one
might question their incentive to participate in a process which by and large attempts to
exclude them (Melyantsou 2012). One could point to this ambiguous nature of the
Belarusian government’s involvement as another weakness of the Dialogue. On the one
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hand, the Union expresses its interest in having government experts on expert teams; on
the other, it insists that official Minsk cannot officially participate in the Dialogue as a
third party (alongside Brussels and Belarusian civil society). This results in
misunderstandings and lack of confidence at the intergovernmental level, which naturally
creates obstacles to the advancement of the initiative (Melyantsou 2012).

Context of Countervailing Forces
One possible explanation for Belarus’ interest in engaging with the EU especially
in 2009 is the deterioration of relations which occurred between Minsk and Moscow at
that time. That relationship was mended though, when Lukashenka signed the declaration
to create a Common Economic Space with Russia and Kazakhstan on December 8, 2010,
less than two weeks prior to Belarus’ presidential elections (Ananicz 2011). The easing
of tensions between Russia and Belarus likely contributed to Lukashenka’s idea that he
could repress opposition forces and to put a brake on their growing influence and show
the government apparatus that the system is stable. So he arranged the electoral fraud, the
brutal crack down on the opposition. This course of events would arguably have been less
likely if relations with Moscow had remained strained (Ananicz 2011).
Moreover, Belarus’ confidence in the customs union with its eastern partners has
been illustrated in its repeated ignoring of European demands to hold free and fair
elections, and to respect human rights. Take, for instance, the case of the 2012
parliamentary elections which were determined by the OSCE to be fraudulent and to have
taken place under repressive conditions (OSCE 2012). Thus, an essential question for the
EU’s future relations with Belarus will be how durable is the relationship between Minsk
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and Moscow.

Other EU Democracy Promotion Actors
Just as the EU’s activities must be considered with regard to what other states or
actors are trying to push Belarus in the other direction, it is also important to consider
what other international organizations and non-governmental organizations are working
to push Belarus in the same direction the EU hopes it will go: toward democracy. NGO’s
are entities sometimes better suited than government institutions at obtaining accurate
information and determining priorities (EEAS 2013). The EU holds regular consultations
with NGO networks like the Confederation for Cooperation of Relief and Development,
the European Network of Foundations for Democracy Support, the European Network of
Independent Political Foundations in Democracy Promotion and Development
Cooperation, the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office and the Human Rights and
Democracy Network (EEAS 2013).
The European Commission offers financial support to groups such as the
European Network of Political Foundations which publishes a quarterly review on the
state of democratization around the world. This Foundation also organizes projects, such
as one focused on democratization which took place in September 2011 when eight
democracy activists from Belarus, Bolivia, Burma, Russia, South Sudan and Zimbabwe
participated in two weeks of intensive practical and academic training in Prague focusing
on subjects such as democratic governance, anti-corruption, civic society, and democracy
policy (ENoP Quarterly 2012, 5). The Union also funds hundreds of national and
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domestic NGO’s targeted at promoting democracy in neighboring states via the European
Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). This instrument tends to grant
funding directly to NGO’s rather than channel it through national authorities; it also tends
to be allocated for short-term projects and NGO’s are assumed to remain subordinate to
the activities of the institutions (Stewart 2006, 18).
Another way democracy promoting NGO’s obtain financing is via private
organizations, national assemblies and bodies, and money from other countries with
similar objectives, such as the U.S. Examples of European NGO’s receiving funds from
US organizations for democracy promotion purposes are: Experts without Borders,
whereby Estonian government officials held training sessions in Belarus on government
theory and practices, or the Polish-Czech-Slovak Solidarity Foundation which trains
democracy activists and journalists in desktop publishing and provides equipment
support, both of which received funding from the Washington-based National
Endowment for Democracy (NED.org). Such activities supplement the EU’s activities in
Belarus, although they are not conditionality based and tend to provide support for civil
society to promote regime change from within instead of attempts to influence it, as EU
policy does, from outside.

Conclusion
The European Union has used conditionality in many of its attempts to influence
democratization in Belarus, largely through partnership agreements. This chapter
covered the use of conditionality in three policies instrumental to EU-Belarus relations
over the past decade: The European Neighborhood Policy, the Eastern Partnership and
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the Dialogue on Modernization. The European Neighborhood Policy was an attempt by
the EU to enhance cooperation with its Eastern neighbors along issues of common
concern; for Belarus, this cooperation would only take place if the country agreed to
adhere to certain requirements regarding the rule of law, respect for human rights, and
democratic practices. Belarus, viewing its position as that of an equal partner to the EU,
refused to accept such conditionality requirements and continued its political repression
and human rights abuses (i.e. the 2006 elections). Consequently, Belarusian authorities
were excluded from the Neighborhood partnership.
Understanding that the ENP was not serving as a useable framework for the EUBelarus relationship, the Union developed the Eastern partnership in an attempt to open
cooperation possibilities for Belarus. The multilateral track of the agreement allowed
opportunities for Belarus to receive European aid for economic reforms and energy
security measures as well as offered more attractive packages for visa facilitation and
economic integration. While the early years of the partnership (2008 through the
beginning of 2010) appeared promising for Euro-Belarusian relations, the violent
crackdown in 2010 on opposition forces cast severe doubt about the effectiveness of the
policy. The EU cut off a majority of its relations with the Belarusian state in 2011, and
implemented severe bans and asset freezes on over 200 members of the Belarusian
government.
This was a turning point for the EU’s policy toward Belarus. In the policy
proposals following the 2010 crackdown, a distinct emphasis on civil society can be
noticed. This is particularly evident in the 2012 proposal of the Dialogue on
Modernization, which sought to support civil society in the country and engage with civil
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society and opposition forces on reform issues. Furthermore, this agreement carries with
it more lenient conditionality requirements, specifying only that Belarus must release
political prisoners for participation (as opposed to enacting democratic reforms, a much
more costly venture). The Dialogue has been successful in providing civil society greater
international legitimacy and participation in EU-Belarus relations. While the
parliamentary elections held in 2012 proved to be less than democratic in nature, one
could understand the Belarusian authorities’ February 2013 request to participate in the
Dialogue as an indicator that they see added value in its work.
Underneath all of the failures and successes of these measures has been Belarus’
relationship with Russia: pushing Belarus to further engage with the EU when relations
with Russia were strained, and giving it a sense of freedom to reject the EU’s
conditionality requirements when the relationship was strong. Such considerations
underline the precarious nature of the EU-Belarus relationship, and reinforce the idea that
Europe must develop a package of incentives great enough to outweigh those offered by
the Kremlin if it hopes to find a way of consistently exerting influence in Belarus and
bringing the country closer to a democratic transition. The contributions made by
funding and assisting domestic NGO’s in Belarus may be one way of providing
Belarusian citizens the encouragement and support they need to succeed.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION

Summary
This thesis has been centered around two primary research questions: (1) What
have been the policies of the EU intended to encourage democracy in Belarus? and (2)
What have been the impacts of these policies on Belarus’ level of democracy? Using data
from political science journals, government documents, periodicals, and polling data
collected from international and non-governmental organizations, I am able to describe
the specific policies of the EU and the observed impacts they had on levels on democracy
in Belarus. In the introductory chapter, I determined to use a substantive definition of
democracy which encompasses both the systemic and ideological components of the
term. I then suggested that both the Polity IV and Freedom House scales be used to
evaluate a state’s level of democratization; based on these rankings, Belarus was
illustrated to be a highly authoritarian regime. The European Union, a supporter of
democratic peace theory, was therefore demonstrated to have a reasonable cause in
promoting democracy in Belarus.
Belarus was discussed as an outlier with regard to more common patterns of
regime change in post-Soviet states. The country’s deep economic, historical and political
ties to Russia set it apart from many neighboring states which have undergone democratic
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transitions. Russia’s willingness to support Lukashenka in international arenas and to
prop up the Belarusian economy in exchange for a certain amount of control over it have
limited the impact Belarus has felt from foreign sanctions and restrictions (Gnedina 2005,
43). In addition, as Marples (2006, quoted in Forbes 2009, 29) suggests, other
contributing factors are also Lukashenka’s “personal popularity, his strong control of the
media and propensity for punishing the opposition.” Another proposition is that
Belarusians simply don’t have a history of democracy, and that they willingly accept a
social contract between the people and the president whereby the population accepts
certain antidemocratic practices in exchange for economic security and stability in their
daily lives (Jarabik & Silitski 2008, 102). Belarus remains an outlier in the history of
post-communist democratization studies, although many different factors continue to
influence its progress.
I began by considering the ways in which internal versus external actors might aid
or abet democratic progress, using specific examples about Belarus to justify the case that
external agents have a significant influence on a domestic polity’s level of democracy.
Democracy promotion occurs in several ways; those outlined in this thesis were: linkage
(the density of ties between two states, of which Belarus and the EU have had relatively
low levels), leverage (a state’s vulnerability to outside pressure, which the economic
downturn has increased for Belarus), neighbor (rationale whereby spatial proximity is
purported to have a positive correlation with a state’s chance at democratizing, relevant
for the case of Belarus and the EU), and that of transnational advocacy networks
(political spaces where different actors determine the social and political norms of
international behavior, relevant for Belarus and the EU because the EU is can be
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considered one of these networks). The EU carries out the process of democratic
diffusion via policies based on conditionality, that is, the concept of offering incentives
and/or disincentives (i.e. economic sanctions, travel bans, etc.) for a target state to
conform its behavior to that desired by the EU.
Neighbor state and transnational advocacy networks were shown to be the most
frequent and effective levels of democratic diffusion, and the EU falls into both
categories with regard to Belarus. This would lead one to believe that Union is a wellsuited agent of democracy promotion in Belarus; but this has not overwhelmingly been
the case. While the European Union’s use of conditionality clauses in its agreements with
third parties proved effective in bringing about democratic transition in Poland,
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in the early 2000’s, the results were not the same for
Belarus.
As was seen in chapter three, three of the EU’s conditionality-based democracy
promotion policies (the European Neighborhood Policy, the Eastern Partnership and the
Dialogue on Modernization) produced varying outcomes regarding Belarus’ level of
democratization. The first two arrangements carried with them certain requirements
pertaining to the rule of law, respect for human rights, and democratic practices for
Belarus to participate. The ENP was strict regarding adherence to these measures and
Belarus’ refusal to respect the conditionality requirements resulted in a type of stalemate
regarding democratic progress. The “new and improved” Eastern Partnership allowed
Belarus to participate in its multilateral track without such strict adherence to these
conditions while keeping the bilateral option off the table. There was limited hope for
liberalization observed during this time period as Belarus made small concessions to the

	
  

70

EU in exchange for economic incentives; however the violent political crackdown in
2010 made it clear that the EaP was not the ideal solution either.
In the more recently developed Dialogue on Modernization, the EU adopts a
much softer line of conditionality, requiring only the release and rehabilitation of political
prisoners for participation. While that condition has proven too much for Belarus to
concede, the Dialogue’s emphasis on civil society and its ability already to attract some
of the Belarusian political elite to participate are signs of improvement. It suggests that
the EU’s recent shift in policy orientation away from strict conditionality toward civil
society and cooperation on non-political issues (i.e. the Dialogue on Modernization)
appears to be a step in the right direction. Recent initiatives by the Belarusian
government indicate the state’s strong interest in participating in the Dialogue, a likely
sign that the regime is feeling pressured by the EU and by domestic civil society actors.
As Melyantsou (2012, 64) suggests, the evolution of EU policy and actions
toward Belarus imply a certain level of institutional learning on the part of the Union. A
specific example can be seen after Lukashenka’s violent crackdown on opposition parties
in December 2010. European politicians clearly saw that their existing policies toward
Belarus were inefficient because Lukashenka had broken the promises he made to the
EU. The European Parliament held special committee meetings to determine how policy
should change; the result was a return to sanctions, with the lenient condition that
sanctions could be removed after the release of political prisoners (Melyantsou 2012, 64).
Institutional learning and the European Union’s improved access to information on the
situation in Belarus via on-line journalists, bloggers, etc. means an increased opportunity
for the EU to create effective policies. But because these policies carry with them certain
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conditions which must be met by the Belarusian government, only time will tell if
Lukashenka is willing to bend to the EU’s conditions for participation to be possible.
Limitations
A plethora of attempts have been made to single out a mono-causal explanation
for why democratic transitions have occurred in some post-Soviet states but not in others,
none of which have proved particularly fruitful (Gel’man 2008, 159). This thesis has not
been intended to propose the defining causal factor behind Belarus’ reluctance to
democratize, but to contribute insight to the multiple levels of research surrounding this
topic. As with any political analysis, the arguments postulated herein are subject to
criticism.
One such critique that could be made is the selection of policies used for analysis.
Admittedly, there are only three policies covered here, all of which are broad in nature
and encompass a number of smaller policy actions, meaning that ample opportunity
remains for a more in-depth analysis of which sub-policies encompassed under the ENP,
for example, were most successful. It would also have been possible to consider policies
less explicit about their intention to further democracy in Belarus, but which still can be
argued to promote democracy at its most basic levels, such as education and civic
engagement.
Furthermore, as was demonstrated above, the European Union is a body of states
with their own competing national interests. Consequently, the “Russia-first” policy of
Germany, France and Italy has frequently conflicted with the state interests of Eastern
Member States such as Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania (Jarabik & Silitski 2008, 102).
Shifting levels of power, capacity, and influence among EU states (such as one country
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taking its turn to serve in the EU’s rotating presidency) means that policy objectives and
actions are also subject to change. A lack of policy coordination, and internal struggles
in general, could be perhaps an internal explanation for why EU democracy promotion
policies have been ineffectual in Belarus. An institutional perspective may be useful in
future studies to fully explore this and other possibilities.
Additionally, EU Member States participate in a number of other international
organizations and non-governmental organizations which are also aimed at promoting
democracy in its neighborhood. Since these activities occur at different levels and in
different quantities, it is difficult for researchers to determine which statistics accurately
reflect an EU-wide analysis (for example, the precise financial contribution of the EU –
including institutions, private firms, national assemblies and bodies, etc.). Along the
same lines, it is equally challenging to distinguish which of these organizations is having
more influence than the others. Considering the possibility of any causal links between
the activities of one organization and the level of democracy in Belarus is an immensely
trying task for political researchers. With no observed change in the country’s level of
democracy in over a decade, it is impossible to argue that any outside actor instigated
democratic change in Belarus; the next step therefore is to consider why the democratic
levels here have not changed when they have in other post-Soviet states.
One way to tackle this problem may be to construct a research design using a nonequivalent control group. A researcher could select other countries to include in the
sample using a certain set of variables (i.e. the presence of a strong political elite, the
level of restriction placed on the internet and media, national pride, etc.). Choosing
appropriate countries, the researcher could then make observations about how a particular
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treatment (such as EU democracy promotion policies) affected the level of democracy in
those countries. This would open up the possibility for causal inferences to be made
regarding the potential success of such policies.
Also, any study of Belarus is plagued by the overwhelming problem of acquiring
valid statistics and data about the country. It has been argued by Belarusian scholars that
the attitudes of the Belarusian citizenry are not always well reflected in the positions
adopted by the Belarusian government (Lahniviec & Papko 2010). The arguments made
in this thesis, such as Belarus’ willingness to adhere to EU conditionality measures, must
thus be understood as that of the Belarusian state and not that of the population at large.
The opinion poll data presented in the previous chapter can only be conceived of as
indicators of how the public might feel, since intimidation and a severe skepticism of
Western NGO’s (who are largely responsible for collecting such data) is part of everyday
life in Belarus. Another factor is the freedom of information in Belarus, which is also
severely limited and results in gaps in the data collected by monitoring groups that are
sometimes not allowed into the country (such as with the OSCE in 2011) (Melyantsou
2012, Lahniviec & Papko 2010).
Finally, as I have acknowledged, another significant consideration which must be
made in the evaluation of the EU’s effectiveness in promoting democratic progress in
Belarus is the strong presence of countervailing forces acting on Belarus simultaneously.
Russia’s influence has already been highlighted; however other countries are also active
in the region. For example, China, Iran, Venezuela and several Arab countries of the
Persian Gulf have been pointed to as emerging partners (Bohdan 2010, 100). The shift
in partners may suggest emerging trends and interests in Belarusian foreign and domestic
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policy. If one considers what the aforementioned countries have in common, it is easy to
point to oil and natural resources as one commonality: what insight does this provide
about where Belarus’ interests lie, and where they seem to be heading? Such questions
will necessarily be posed by future researchers.

Avenues for Future Research
The purpose of this thesis has been to consider how effective the European
Union’s conditionality-driven democracy promotion policies have been. As has been
argued, the EU’s policies have not been highly effective. More research needs to be done
in order to obtain a better grasp on how these policies could be made to have a greater
impact on the level of democracy in Belarus. Studies could be done on a broad range of
topics to support this objective.
First, there remains a great deal of opportunity for scholars to examine what
constellation of factors has made Belarus the outlier it remains today. Certain arguments
were presented in this paper; yet those political scientists viewing domestic conditions as
the most important indicator of democracy promotion would make very different cases
about why Belarus remains under authoritarian regime. While any argument is
dependent upon the theory used, perhaps identifying concrete factors which created an
environment hostile to democracy and a regime capable of keeping it out despite millions
of dollars and years of political democracy promotion efforts would assist democratizing
forces in taking more effective action. If one could point to a certain set of factors in
Belarus which explain its long history of authoritarianism, perhaps those factors could
help scholars’ understanding of other long-standing authoritarian regimes as well.
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Moreover, future researchers should seek to better understand the different circumstances
existing in Belarus and other similar post-Soviet states so as to identify the areas in which
democracy promoters should focus their attentions – or if democracy promotion in these
states is even possible.
Political scientists studying the process of democratic diffusion across states
should also consider the openness of a country to outside influence. Further analysis
should be done on the amount of restrictions placed on the media as well as the impact
those restrictions have on the potential influence of outside agents. In this way, a political
scientist could study the situation of country openness across a broad range of
authoritarian states and determine whether or not democracy promotion efforts from
foreign actors have the potential to bring about any significant level of change. If
anything, my results illustrated how difficult it has been for the EU to incite any
significant democratic progress in Belarus.
In addition, it may be interesting to analyze the European Union’s attempts at
democracy promotion in a similar way to the actions taken by non-governmental
organizations. A scholar could apply NGO literature discussing the most effective
systemic features or actions of NGOs in undemocratic countries to the European Union’s
efforts. Considerations could include looking at what types of projects the EU tends to
fund: short-term or long-term? Ones that correspond to the EU’s own agenda, or ones
reflecting the priorities of the local associates? Furthermore, more research could be done
on the impacts of Lukashenka’s crackdown on foreign NGO’s operating in Belarus. How
have restrictions, regulations, and taxation impacted the activities of foreign and domestic
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democracy-focused NGOs? What has been the effect on democracy? Is this another way
Lukashenka is maintaining his hold on power?
Future research on democratization in Belarus should also take into consideration
the countries with which Lukashenka chooses to partner. Are there any discernible
characteristics which prove to be true across all of these countries, or for the types of
partnerships? For example: Are they all autocratic? Are they known for a certain foreign
policy style? Are partnerships political or economic in nature, or both? Are the
partnerships successful or wrought with conflict? If Belarus only enters into deals with
other autocratic states, could a theory be derived linking this to the perpetuation of
authoritarianism? How would such a theory compete against or complement theories
arguing that democracies tend to enjoy better relations with other democracies while
relations between autocracies tend to be wrought with conflict (Geva & Hanson 1999,
809)? Can ideas about democracy override or undercut political and economic
relationships? Regime change is without doubt caused by a multitude of factors
(Gel’man 2008, 159); the political scientist’s responsibility is to discern the many
dimensions behind it.
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APPENDIX
BISS

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies

CEEC

Central and Eastern European Country

CFSP

Common Foreign & Security Policy

CSF

Civil Society Forum

CSO

Civil Society Organization

DCFTA

Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area

DoM

Dialogue on Modernization

EaP

Eastern Partnership

EEAS

European External Action Service

EED

European Endowment for Democracy

EEU

Eurasian Economic Union

ENP

European Neighborhood Policy

ENPI

European Neighborhood Policy Instrument

EU

European Union

GDP

Gross Domestic Product

GSP

Generalized System of Preferences

IIPSEPS

Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies

IMF

International Monetary Fund

KGB

Committee for State Security (of Belarus)

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCSF

National Civil Society Forum

NED

National Endowment for Democracy

NGO

Nongovernmental Organization

OSCE

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

PCA

Partnership and Co-operation Agreement

UN

United Nations

US

United States

USSR

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
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